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Patently Insane for Patents: A Judge-by-
Judge Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s 
Post-Alice Patentable Subject Matter 
Eligibility of Abstract Ideas 
Jurisprudence 
By Matthew B. Hershkowitz* 
The Information Age exposed the U.S. patent system to 
patentable subject matter that it had never considered before. In 
particular, software tested the courts’ understanding of patentable 
subject matter under section 101 of title 35 of the U.S. Code. The 
Supreme Court grappled with this issue in its Alice Corp. v. CLS 
Bank International decision, which greatly affected the 
patentability of software. However, the Supreme Court did not 
define the precise contours of patentable subject matter in Alice, 
and as a result, the Federal Circuit has wrestled with its meaning 
ever since. This Note discusses the approaches Federal Circuit 
judges apply to determine whether a patent claims patentable 
subject matter. It begins by providing background regarding 
patents, patent litigation, the Supreme Court’s patentable subject 
matter cases prior to Alice, and then the Alice decision and its 
effect. It then examines the Federal Circuit’s post-Alice decisions 
implementing the two-step test Alice applied. The test first asks 
whether the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea and 
                                                                                                             
*  Managing Editor, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law 
Journal, Volume XXVIII; J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2018; 
B.S. Mechanical Engineering, Lehigh University, 2014. I would like to thank Professor 
Janet Freilich for her guidance and feedback through developing this Note, and the IPLJ 
Editorial Board and staff for their hard work throughout the editorial process, especially 
E. Alex Kirk and Jillian Roffer. 
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then, if it is, whether the claimed invention contains an inventive 
concept. Federal Circuit judges have considered different aspects 
of the claimed invention in making these two determinations. As 
such, this Note analyzes the Federal Circuit judges’ decisions and 
discerns trends in their approaches. Relying on these patterns, this 
Note next suggests to litigators how to better argue the 
patentability of software before the Federal Circuit. Furthermore, 
this Note posits that the Federal Circuit judges who implement 
different consistent approaches in essence ask the same question, 
and that the judges who do not implement a consistent approach 
will likely fall in line with the judges who apply consistent 
approaches. Finally, this Note predicts that the Federal Circuit 
will continue to expand the definition of patentable subject matter 
under Alice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The rise of the Information Age1 created uncertainty for the 
patentability of software. As technology changed, the courts 
adapted their approaches to evaluating patents and, more 
specifically, how they determine whether patents claim patent-
eligible subject matter.2 The Supreme Court announced the Alice 
Corp. v. CLS Bank International decision in 2014 and the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) has since 
wrestled with the decision.3 The Alice decision applied a two-step 
analysis to determine whether a patent claims patentable subject 
matter, asking (1) whether the claims are directed to an abstract 
idea,4 and (2) if they are so directed, whether they contain an 
inventive concept.5 
The Alice decision “upended”6 patent law and resulted in a 
“legendary” invalidation rate of asserted patents.7 The post-Alice 
uncertainty caused many in the legal field to try to decipher how 
                                                                                                             
1 The information age is “the modern age regarded as a time in which information has 
become a commodity that is quickly and widely disseminated and easily available 
especially through the use of computer technology.” Information Age, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Information%20Age (last 
visited June 12, 2017) [https://perma.cc/N4LG-EDBW]. 
2 See infra Sections I.C–E. 
3 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). See infra Sections I.D–E, II.B. 
4 See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (“First, we determine whether the claims at issue are 
directed to one of the patent-ineligible concepts [i.e., abstract ideas].”). The Supreme 
Court has held a variety of claimed inventions invalid as claiming patent-ineligible 
subject matter. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3222 (2010) (holding a patent 
claiming a financial hedging process invalid as claiming an abstract idea); Parker v. 
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) (invalidating a patent claiming a mathematical formula 
without an inventive concept); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972) 
(invalidating a patent claiming a mathematical algorithm as only applied to digital 
computers); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 120 (1853) (holding a claim to any 
machinery using electromagnetism to mark or print characters, signs, or letters at any 
distance as void). 
5 See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. 
6 Rajit Kapur et al., Certain Uncertainty: The Future of Computer Software Patents, 
LEXOLOGY (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=115145b7-
dd58-4aea-9f87-e1679cb56b24 [https://perma.cc/768L-GQAT]. 
7 Lewis E. Hudnell, The Wonderland of Patent Ineligibility as Litigation Defense, 
LAW360 (June 5, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/662143/the-wonderland-of-
patent-ineligibility-as-litigation-defense [https://perma.cc/6SAV-ZMJM]. 
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courts analyze whether a patent claims patentable subject matter, 
but often to no avail.8 Moreover, scholars have posited different 
tests for determining whether a patent claims patentable subject 
matter, or have argued how the courts should apply the Alice test.9 
While scholars often consider the Federal Circuit as a whole and 
suggest what the court should do, this Note examines how each 
Federal Circuit judge approaches deciding patentable subject 
matter eligibility post-Alice.10 The trends identified through this 
examination will enable litigators to more persuasively argue for or 
against patentability before Federal Circuit judges.11 
This Note discerns consistent methodologies in executing the 
Alice inquiry for four Federal Circuit judges.12 These judges 
reliably ask the same questions within their cases when 
determining whether the claimed invention is directed to an 
abstract idea, and searching for an inventive concept.13 This Note 
then reviews the approaches of six Federal Circuit judges who 
implement different inquiries or factors in the decisions they have 
authored.14 However, for these judges, as this Note highlights, 
some trends exist under either Alice step one or step two.15 
Understanding the Federal Circuit judges’ approaches to the Alice 
inquiry will empower litigators to craft more persuasive arguments 
by tailoring their arguments accordingly.16 
Part I of this Note provides an understanding of the basics of 
patent law,17 patent litigation,18 and the Federal Circuit,19 and then 
                                                                                                             
8 See Ryan Davis, Patent Eligibility Confusion Reigns Post-Alice, Experts Say, 
LAW360 (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/636273/patent-eligibility-
confusion-reigns-post-alice-experts-say [https://perma.cc/Q374-7UTC]. 
9 See infra note 139. 
10 See infra Section II.B. 
11 See infra Section III.A. 
12 See infra Section II.B.1. 
13 See infra Section II.B.1. 
14 See infra Section II.B.2. 
15 See infra Section II.B.2. 
16 See infra Section III.A. 
17 See infra Section I.A. 
18 See infra Section I.B. 
19 See infra Section I.B. 
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focuses on the relevant Supreme Court decisions.20 More 
specifically, it reviews the Supreme Court’s patentable subject 
matter decisions during the Information Age,21 and concludes with 
an explanation of the Alice decision22 and its impact on patent 
law.23 Part II analyzes the Federal Circuit’s implementation of the 
Alice decision.24 In particular, it attempts to decipher and identify 
how each judge approaches deciding patentable subject matter 
issues.25 Finally, Part III provides advice to litigators on how to 
more persuasively argue patentable subject matter eligibility before 
the Federal Circuit,26 and then posits predictions about where the 
Federal Circuit judges’ and, more generally, the Federal Circuit’s 
views on patentable subject matter are heading.27 
I. THE BASICS OF PATENT LAW, A PRIMER ON PATENT 
LITIGATION, AND THE SUPREME COURT’S RELEVANT PATENTABLE 
SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY JURISPRUDENCE 
This Part provides background on patent law, patent litigation, 
and the Supreme Court’s patentable subject matter decisions. 
Section I.A explains the patent law basics: what is a patent, why 
the government grants patents, how an inventor secures a patent, 
and what are the requirements to obtain a patent. Section I.B then 
discusses patent litigation and the Federal Circuit. Next, Section 
I.C reviews the Supreme Court’s cases deciding patentable subject 
matter eligibility. Finally, Section I.D focuses on the Alice 
decision, while Section I.E illuminates the challenges created by, 
and the effects of, that decision. 
                                                                                                             
20 See infra Section I.C. 
21 See infra Section I.C. 
22 See infra Section I.D. 
23 See infra Section I.E. 
24 See infra Section II.B. 
25 See infra Section II.B. 
26 See infra Section III.A. 
27 See infra Section III.B. 
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A. Foundation of Patents and Patentable Subject Matter 
The first patent was granted in 1790 for a process of making 
potash, an ingredient in fertilizer.28 To date, the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (“USPTO”) has granted more than nine million 
patents.29 In today’s modern economy, patents are an integral part 
of a company’s success and value.30 
A patent is a property right granted under the Constitution to an 
inventor for a limited time31 that grants the inventor “‘the right to 
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling’ the 
invention in the United States or ‘importing’ the invention into the 
United States.”32 The patent’s term continues for twenty years 
from the date the patent application was filed or, under certain 
circumstances, from the filing date of a previously filed related 
application.33 Patents come in three varieties: utility patents, plant 
patents, and design patents.34 
                                                                                                             
28 See Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, First U.S. Patent Issued Today 
in 1790 (July 31, 2001), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/first-us-patent-
issued-today-1790 [https://perma.cc/XQN4-GS7E]. 
29 See U.S. Patent No. 9,554,210 (filed June 25, 2015). The patent number, which 
indexes the patents issued, is over 9,500,000. 
30 See Reasons for Patenting Your Inventions, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/importance/reasons.htm 
[https://perma.cc/CP4N-L4DZ] (last visited July 27, 2017) (listing reasons why patents 
are important to companies). 
31 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”). 
32 What Are Patents, Trademarks, Servicemarks, and Copyrights?, Section of General 
Information Concerning Patents, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (Oct. 2015), 
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerning-patents 
[https://perma.cc/3UVX-9LHS] [hereinafter What are Patents?] (quoting 35 U.S.C. 
§ 154(a)(1) (2012)). 
33 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2); see also What are Patents?, supra note 32. 
34 See What Are Patents?, supra note 32. The USPTO may grant a utility patent “to 
anyone who invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, article of 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” Id. 
For the purposes of this Note, only utility patents are considered and all references to 
“patent” refer to utility patents. 
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The exclusive right a patent provides incentivizes inventors to 
create and disclose inventions.35 When the patent term expires, the 
invention enters the public domain, eliminating the inventor’s 
exclusive right, and allows society to freely use the invention, 
which in turn benefits society by permitting further invention.36 
Without patent protection, the inventor would be less incentivized 
to invent and would resist disclosing the invention because the 
inventor would fear someone stealing it.37 
To obtain a patent, the inventor or assignee38 must file an 
application with the USPTO.39 A patent application contains 
several parts, but only the specification and claims are relevant to 
this Note. “The specification is a written description of the 
invention and of the manner and process of making and using the 
invention that concludes with the claims to the invention.”40 The 
claims “particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject 
matter that the [inventor or inventors] regard[] as the invention.”41 
The USPTO examines the application to determine whether it 
satisfies the requirements under title 35 of the U.S. Code.42 The 
                                                                                                             
35 See J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 931 (2011) 
(“Scholars recognize that the patent system benefits society not merely because of the 
increased disclosure that results from patenting, but also (and primarily) because of the 
incentive to invent that the patent system creates.”). 
36 See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 541 (2009). 
37 See David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The 
Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 196–97 (2009) 
(providing that patents are a public good and without patent protection, they would  
be underproduced). 
38 An assignee is “[a] type of patent owner, who has had ownership transferred to her 
from a previous owner such as the inventor.” Glossary, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, https://web.archive.org/web/20170627184309/https://www.uspto.gov/patents-
maintaining-patent/patent-litigation/glossary [https://perma.cc/76EZ-H98Q] (last visited 
June 12, 2017) [hereinafter Glossary]. 
39 See What are Patents?, supra note 32. 
40 Specification, Section of Nonprovisional (Utility) Patent Application Filing Guide, 
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (Jan. 2014), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-
started/patent-basics/types-patent-applications/nonprovisional-utility-patent#heading-1 
[https://perma.cc/WR9G-VQ7X]. 
41 Id. 
42 See Patent Laws, Section of General Information Concerning Patents, U.S. PATENT 
& TRADEMARK OFFICE (Oct. 2015), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started
/general-information-concerning-patents [https://perma.cc/3UVX-9LHS]. 
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Manual for Patent Examining Procedure explains the examination 
process.43 Specifically, the USPTO will decide whether the 
invention complies with sections 101, 102, 103, and 112 of title 
35.44 If the USPTO finds the application satisfactory, it grants the 
applicant a patent, contingent on the payment of fees.45 
Each provision under title 35 poses at least one requirement for 
the invention. Briefly stated, section 101, the subject of this Note, 
requires that the patent claims patentable subject matter.46 Section 
102 requires that the invention is new,47 and section 103 demands 
that the invention is sufficiently different from the prior art,48 such 
that the invention would not be obvious to a person having 
ordinary skill in the art49 to which the invention pertains.50 Finally, 
section 112 focuses on the application’s sufficiency, requiring the 
specification contain an adequate written description.51 The 
specification must demonstrate that the inventor was in possession 
of the invention at the time of the application, that the information 
disclosed in the specification enables a person having ordinary 
skill in the art to make and use the invention, and that the 
                                                                                                             
43 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL FOR PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE (9th ed., rev. 07.2015, Nov. 2015). 
44 See id. § 2103. 
45 See Allowance and Issue of Patent, Section of General Information Concerning 
Patents, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (Oct. 2015), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-
getting-started/general-information-concerning-patents [https://perma.cc/3UVX-9LHS]. 
46 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
47 See id. § 102. 
48 See id. § 103. “Prior art consists of the references (books, articles, web pages and 
other information) that are publicly available before the date that the application was 
filed.” Glossary, supra note 38. 
49 See 35 U.S.C. § 103. “The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person 
who is presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention.” U.S. 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 43, § 2141.03.I. 
50 See 35 U.S.C. § 103; see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 
(2007); Novelty and Non-Obviousness, Conditions for Obtaining a Patent, Section of 
General Information Concerning Patents, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (Oct. 
2015), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerning-
patents [https://perma.cc/3UVX-9LHS]. 
51 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012); see also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra 
note 43, § 2103. 
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specification discloses the best mode of performing  
the invention.52 
Section 101 defines patentable subject matter. It provides: 
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor[e], 
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”53 Section 
101 provides four express categories that can receive patent 
protection: process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter.54 A process is “an act, or a series of acts or steps.”55 A 
machine is “a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain 
devices and combination of devices,” which includes “every 
mechanical device or combination of mechanical powers and 
devices to perform some function and produce a certain effect or 
result.”56 In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court defined 
manufacture as “the production of articles for use from raw or 
prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, 
qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by hand-labor or by 
machinery.”57 The Court also defined a composition of matter in 
Chakrabarty as “all compositions of two or more substances 
and . . . all composite articles, whether they be the results of 
chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or whether they be 
gases, fluids, powders or solids.”58 Since Thomas Jefferson’s draft 
of the 1793 Patent Act, section 101 has undergone little revision.59 
Notably, Jefferson’s view that “ingenuity should receive a liberal 
encouragement” remains intact.60 Furthermore, when Congress 
                                                                                                             
52 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 43, § 2103. 
53 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 43, § 2103. 
54 See 35 U.S.C. § 101; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 43, § 2103. 
55 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 43, § 2106.I.i. 
56 Id. § 2106.I.ii (citations omitted). 
57 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (quoting Am. Fruit Growers v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 
11 (1931)). 
58 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279, 280 
(D.D.C. 1957)). 
59 See id. at 309 (explaining that the only amendment made to the Act was to replace 
“art” in Jefferson’s version with “process”). 
60 Id. at 308–09 (quoting 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75–76 (Washington  
ed. 1871)). 
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considered the 1952 Patent Act, it intended patentable subject 
matter to “include anything under the sun that is made  
by man.”61 
However, the breadth of patent protection is not unlimited. The 
courts have created judicial exceptions to patentable subject matter 
that exclude natural phenomena, laws of nature, and abstract ideas 
from patentability.62 These exceptions are not new, and in fact 
have existed for over 150 years.63 They protect against preemption 
of the “basic tools of scientific and technological work” because it 
would “‘impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it,’ 
thereby thwarting the primary object of the patent laws.”64 
However, the Supreme Court has avoided precisely defining an 
abstract idea.65 
With technology moving towards software innovation and 
away from mechanical inventions, the judicial exceptions have 
impacted more inventions. For example, in the Industrial Age,66 
                                                                                                             
61 Id. at 309 (quoting S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923,  
at 6 (1952)). 
62 See id.; see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2107, 2116 (2013) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. 
Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012)). 
63 See, e.g., O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112–20 (1853); Le Roy v. 
Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174–75 (1852). 
64 See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting Mayo 
Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1293). For example, Einstein could not have patented 
his theory of special relativity and Newton could not have patented the law of gravity 
because they both are laws of nature. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309. Moreover, a 
gene is not patentable because it is a natural phenomenon. See Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 2120. 
65 See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357; see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 219 (1981) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he cases considering the patentability of program-related 
inventions do not establish rules that enable a conscientious patent lawyer to determine 
with a fair degree of accuracy which, if any, program-related inventions will be 
patentable.”). Because of the unpredictability of exactly determining whether software 
technology is patentable, this Note attempts to bring some predictability to the court’s 
determination by examining how each judge makes such determination. 
66 Industrial Age, ENG. OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries
.com/definition/industrial_age [https://perma.cc/5R4W-R889] (last visited June 12, 2017) 
(defining the Industrial Age as “[a]n era marked by widespread industrialization; 
specifically . . . the period in the history of the developed world from the start of the 
Industrial Revolution, in the late [eighteenth] cent[ury], to the information age, in the late 
[twentieth] cent[ury]”). 
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patents claiming inventions not either tied to a machine or 
apparatus, or transforming an article into another state or thing, 
were rarely granted.67 In the Information Age, now, the abstract 
idea judicial exception has severely impacted software patents 
because software, although implemented on a machine, is not itself 
a machine.68 Moreover, software itself does not transform some 
physical substance from one form to another.69 However, the Court 
opined in Bilski v. Kappos that this does not mean that software  
is unpatentable.70 
As the Information Age approached, the “computer 
industry . . . experienced rapid growth.”71 The advent of the 
Internet accelerated technological advancement.72 In 1995, less 
than one percent of the world’s population used the Internet, 
whereas today, around forty percent use it.73 Computers and the 
Internet are now an integral part of people’s lives. People share on 
social media,74 shop,75 bank,76 and even find new love interests77 
online. The transition from the tangible inventions of the Industrial 
Age to the Information Age’s intangible, process inventions 
challenged the courts to rethink whether such inventions satisfy the 
                                                                                                             
67 See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010). 
68 See Software, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (providing that software is 
instructions that run on a computer which permits it to accept information, translate it, 
and then output other information). 
69 See id. (defining software as instructions implemented on a computer that translates 
and then outputs data, not as something that transforms a physical substance). 
70 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227. 
71 See David C. Tunick, Has the Computer Changed the Law?, 13 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 43, 43 (1994). 
72 See Internet Users, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-
users/ [https://perma.cc/SUM7-6YND] (last visited Mar. 1, 2017). 
73 See id. 
74 See generally, e.g., FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com [https://perma.cc/54FG-
UNMW] (last visited Mar. 1, 2017) (hosting virtual space for users to “post” and “share” 
various media and personal information). 
75 See generally, e.g., AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com [https://perma.cc/U7C7-
9BEW] (last visited Mar. 1, 2017) (providing various products for online purchase). 
76 See generally, e.g., TD BANK, http://www.tdbank.com [https://perma.cc/V5MV-
2X7H] (last visited Mar. 1, 2017) (providing online banking services). 
77 See generally, e.g., MATCH, http://www.match.com [https://perma.cc/759Y-6SMG] 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2017) (acting as an online dating resource). 
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patentable subject matter requirement.78 The Supreme Court has 
wrestled with this patentable subject matter issue for more than 
150 years.79 However, before delving into the Supreme Court’s 
precedent, it is necessary to better understand the court system as it 
pertains to patent infringement lawsuits. 
B. Patent Litigation and the Court of Appeals for the  
Federal Circuit 
The Federal Circuit was formed in 1982 and has nationwide 
appellate jurisdiction in various subject areas, including patent 
law.80 The following example best illustrates the Federal Circuit’s 
role in patent litigation. Imagine that one behemoth cellular 
telephone manufacturer, Apple, Inc., believes that another gigantic 
cellular telephone manufacturer, Samsung Electronics, is 
infringing one of its patents. Apple will file a lawsuit in one of the 
U.S. District Courts81 alleging that Samsung infringed Apple’s 
patent claiming a process implemented on a cellular telephone. 
Samsung, in response, will likely claim as one of its defenses that 
Apple’s patent is invalid because it claims patent-ineligible subject 
matter—this Note’s focus. 
After the district court litigation, either or both parties may 
appeal the decision.82 The Federal Circuit will hear the appeal, 
regardless of which district court decided the case, because the 
subject matter is patent law.83 A randomly selected panel 
comprising of three Federal Circuit judges will decide the appeal,84 
and one of the judges will author an opinion for the panel.85 After 
the Federal Circuit decision, Apple and/or Samsung may request a 
                                                                                                             
78 See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010). 
79 See infra Section I.C. 
80 Court Jurisdiction, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.
cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction [https://perma.cc/76MA-HTK2] (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2017). 
81 The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases. See 28 U.S.C.  
§ 1338 (2012). 
82 See FED. R. APP. P. 3. 
83 See Court Jurisdiction, supra note 80. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. If there is disagreement between the judges, the disagreeing judge will write a 
dissenting opinion. 
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rehearing with the panel,86 request an en banc rehearing,87 or 
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States.88 
C. The Supreme Court Case Law Determining Patentable Subject 
Matter Eligibility 
The Supreme Court has decided several cases regarding 
patentable subject matter eligibility, and grappled with patentable 
subject matter early on in the 1853 O’Reilly v. Morse case.89 
However, the first Supreme Court case addressing the patentability 
of abstract ideas during the Information Age was Gottschalk v. 
Benson, which reviewed the validity of a mathematical algorithm90 
converting binary-coded decimal91 numerals into pure binary 
numerals,92 and ultimately held it ineligible.93 In deciding that the 
patent did not claim patentable subject matter, the Court noted that 
the claim was broad, thereby preempting both known and unknown 
uses of the process, and that either a generic computer or a human 
could implement the algorithm.94 
                                                                                                             
86 See FED. R. APP. P. 40. 
87 See FED. R. APP. P. 35. A rehearing en banc means that a panel consisting of “all 
eligible and participating active judges, and any senior judge of the court who sat on the 
panel that decided the case originally” will rehear the case. See Appellate Procedure 
Guide, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, (July 2017), https://www.ca4.
uscourts.gov/AppellateProcedureGuide/Decision___Post-Decision/APG-
rehearingandrehearingenbanc.html [https://perma.cc/7LCZ-LX7S]. 
88 See Court Jurisdiction, supra note 80. 
89 See 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112–20 (1853). 
90 An algorithm is a “procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem[.]” 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972). 
91 See id. at 66–67 (“The [Binary-coded decimal] system using decimal numerals 
replaces the character for each component decimal digit in the decimal numeral with the 
corresponding four-digit binary numeral[.]”). 
92 “The pure binary system of positional notation uses two symbols as digits—[zero] 
and [one], placed in a numerical sequence with values based on consecutively ascending 
powers of [two]. In pure binary notation, what would be the tens position is the twos 
position; what would be hundreds position is in the fours position; what would be the 
thousands position is the eights. Any decimal number from [zero] to [ten] can be 
represented in the binary system with four digits or positions . . . .” Id. at 66. 
93 See id. at 71–73. 
94 See id. at 67–68. 
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The Supreme Court elaborated on the patentability of abstract 
ideas six years later in Parker v. Flook,95 a case regarding a 
mathematical formula applied to a catalytic conversion process.96 
There, the patent claimed three steps: (1) measure one of several 
variables, (2) apply an algorithm to calculate a new limit value, 
and (3) adjust an alarm limit to the new value.97 The Court held 
that the addition of conventional, post-solution activity—namely, 
measuring the variable and adjusting the limit—was insufficient to 
convey patentability, and therefore, held that the patent claimed 
patent-ineligible subject matter.98 
Three years later, the Supreme Court considered whether a 
patent claiming a process using a mathematical formula, the 
Arrhenius equation,99 employed on a programmed computer 
claimed patent-eligible subject matter, and concluded in the 
affirmative.100 In Diamond v. Diehr,101 the patent claimed a 
process to cure rubber.102 A computer constantly measured the 
temperature inside a mold containing a rubber piece needing 
curing via a temperature probe, and then inputted the data into the 
Arrhenius equation, which outputted a time for curing.103 When the 
calculated curing time equaled the actual time the rubber piece had 
                                                                                                             
95 See 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978) (noting that “the only novel feature of the method is a 
mathematical formula”). 
96 See id. at 585. The catalytic conversion process converts “heavy hydrocarbons, 
chemicals or fuels to light hydrocarbons, chemical or fuels,” the results are “less toxic, 
less corrosive, more usable and more environmentally friendly,” and it is used in vehicles 
to convert exhaust gas from the engine into less toxic pollutants. See Catalytic 
Conversion, CORROSIONPEDIA, https://www.corrosionpedia.com/definition/1685/catalytic
-conversion [https://perma.cc/389H-5PME] (last visited Mar. 2, 2017). 
97 See Parker, 437 U.S. at 585. 
98 Id. at 586, 594. 
99 The Arrhenius equation is a mathematical expression that embodies temperature’s 
effect on the rate of a chemical reaction. See Arrhenius Equation, ENCYCLOPÆDIA 
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/science/Arrhenius-equation [https://perma.cc
/G5PA-CQG4] (last updated Nov. 13, 2008). 
100 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177, 193 (1981). 
101 450 U.S. 175. 
102 Id. at 177–78. 
103 Id. at 178–79. 
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spent in the mold, the mold opened, thereby permitting removal of 
the rubber piece.104 
First, the Court noted that, like Gottschalk and Flook, the 
Arrhenius equation was an abstract idea.105 However, in contrast to 
Gottschalk and Flook, the application of the abstract idea did not 
preempt the use of the equation outside of its application to the 
rubber curing process, because the process’ other steps placed 
meaningful limits on the claim’s breadth.106 Second, the Court 
recognized that the process transformed something into another 
state, namely, it changed the rubber’s properties and shape.107 
Therefore, the Court concluded that the patent did not claim the 
mathematical formula itself, but a new and useful application of 
the formula.108 
The Supreme Court did not weigh in on the eligibility of 
abstract ideas again until Bilski v. Kappos nearly thirty years 
later.109 In Bilski, the question was whether a patent claiming the 
hedging process, a financial practice, claimed patentable subject 
matter.110 To determine whether the patent claimed patentable 
subject matter, the Court first compared the hedging concept to 
Gottschalk, Flook, and Diehr, and held that hedging was similar to 
the abstract ideas in Gottschalk and Flook—in that patenting 
hedging would “pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and 
would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.”111 The 
Court then rejected Bilski’s argument that it did not preempt the 
entire field because it was limited to the energy industry, finding 
that such limitation was insufficient to convey patent eligibility.112 
                                                                                                             
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 186. 
106 Id. at 187. 
107 Id. at 192–93. 
108 Id. at 191. 
109 See generally Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (holding a patent claiming a 
financial hedging process invalid as claiming an abstract idea). 
110 Id. at 3223. A hedge is “an investment to reduce the risk of adverse price 
movements in an asset,” which normally “consists of taking an offsetting position in a 
related security . . . .” Hedge, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hedge
.asp [https://perma.cc/3QWN-5AAE] (last visited Mar. 23, 2017). 
111 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230–31 (citations omitted). 
112 See id. 
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Therefore, the Court held, Bilski’s patent did not claim patentable 
subject matter.113 
D. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International 
The Supreme Court most recently opined how to determine 
patentable subject matter eligibility in the Alice decision.114 Alice 
was the assignee of several patents relating to managing financial 
risk.115 The patent at issue focused on a “computer-implemented 
scheme for mitigating ‘settlement risk’ (i.e., the risk that only one 
party to a financial transaction will pay what it owes) by using a 
third-party intermediary.”116 Specifically, the patent claimed a 
method whereby a computer created shadow accounts reflecting 
the parties’ actual balances at “‘exchange institutions’ (e.g., 
banks),” and would then only let transactions proceed if the parties 
held sufficient funds in those accounts to satisfy their respective 
obligations.117 CLS Bank filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment 
that Alice’s patent claims were “invalid, unenforceable, or not 
infringed.”118 The district court held the claims invalid, but a 
divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
reversed.119 However, the Federal Circuit granted a rehearing en 
banc, vacated the panel decision, and affirmed the district court 
decision.120 On certiorari, the Supreme Court then addressed 
whether Alice’s invention constituted patent-eligible subject 
matter, and in doing so, applied the two-step analysis implemented 
in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 
                                                                                                             
113 See id. The Court concluded, contrary to the Federal Circuit’s decision, that the 
machine-or-transformation test was not the sole test for subject matter patentability 
because to hold so would violate statutory interpretation principles. Id. at 3227. The 
Court, however, noted that the machine-or-transformation test is still “a useful and 
important clue, an investigative tool,” for determining whether an invention is eligible for 
patent protection. Id. 
114 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
115 Id. at 2352. 
116 Id. at 2351–52 (emphasis omitted). 
117 Id. at 2352. 
118 Id. at 2353. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
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to determine whether Alice’s patent claimed an abstract idea, and 
therefore claimed patent ineligible subject matter.121 
The first step of the Alice analysis is to “determine whether the 
claims at issue are directed to . . . patent-ineligible concepts.”122 If 
the claims are so directed, then the analysis proceeds to step 
two.123 However, if they are not, the patent claims patent-eligible 
subject matter.124 Next, in step two, the court must examine each 
claim at issue to “determine whether it contains an ‘inventive 
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a 
patent-eligible application.” 125 The inventive concept requirement 
ensures that the abstract idea includes something more and is not 
merely a “drafting effort designed to monopolize the  
[abstract idea].”126 
In Alice, under step one, the Court examined its jurisprudence 
on patentable subject matter, specifically Gottschalk, Flook, and 
Bilski, and concluded that Alice’s claims were directed to 
intermediated settlement.127 Then, the Court concluded that 
intermediated settlement was a “fundamental economic practice 
long prevalent in our system of commerce,” like hedging in Bilski, 
and therefore the claims were directed to an abstract idea.128 
Under step two, the Alice court first dispensed with the notion 
that implementation on a computer could provide an inventive 
concept, citing Gottschalk and Flook.129 The Court also 
distinguished the instant case from Diamond v. Diehr, in that the 
invention in Diehr was found patentable not because of the 
computer, as Alice claimed here, but because the claimed process 
                                                                                                             
121 See id. at 2355–60 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 
S. Ct. 1289 (2012)). 
122 Id. at 2355. 
123 See id. 
124 See id. 
125 Id. at 2357 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1294, 1298). What 
qualifies as an inventive concept is not clear, but how to best argue that a claimed 
invention contains an inventive concept is one topic of this Note. Id. 
126 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1291). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 2356 (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010)). 
129 Id. at 2357–58. 
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“improved an existing technological process.”130 Finally, the steps 
claimed in Alice’s patent,131 taken both individually and as an 
ordered combination, were all “‘well-understood, routine, 
conventional activit[ies]’ previously known to the industry.”132 In 
conclusion, the Court noted that neither a generic computer nor 
merely applying the abstract idea is sufficient to transform the 
concept into a patent-eligible invention, and therefore, combining 
the two—as Alice did by employing the abstract idea of 
intermediated settlement on a computer—was likewise 
insufficient.133 Thus, the Court held that Alice’s patent claimed 
patent-ineligible subject matter, and was therefore invalid.134 
Notably, the Alice court avoided “delimit[ing] the precise 
contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category,” instead leaving it open 
to the lower courts to refine.135 Similarly, the Court did not define 
precisely what constitutes an “inventive concept,” only that it is 
something “significantly more” than a patent on the abstract idea 
itself.136 Both open questions have created uncertainty in patent 
                                                                                                             
130 Id. at 2358 (discussing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981)). 
131 See id. at 2359 (“The representative method claim in this case recites the following 
steps: (1) ‘creating’ shadow records for each counterparty to a transaction; (2) 
‘obtaining’ start-of-day balances based on the parties’ real-world accounts at exchange 
institutions; (3) ‘adjusting’ the shadow records as transactions are entered, allowing only 
those transactions for which the parties have sufficient resources; and (4) issuing 
irrevocable end-of-day instructions to the exchange institutions to carry out the  
permitted transactions.”). 
132 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012)). 
133 See id. 
134 See id. at 2360. 
135 Id. at 2357. 
136 See id. at 2355. 
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litigation,137 and some scholars have opined on the proper tests to 
resolve these ambiguities.138 
E. The Effects of the Alice Decision 
The Alice decision has had a profound effect on patent 
litigation. For example, many defendants have successfully 
invalidated patents asserted against them relying on the decision.139 
A patent is presumed valid140 and the challenger must provide 
“clear and convincing evidence” of the patent’s invalidity to 
overcome that presumption.141 Despite this presumption, post-Alice 
courts have invalidated patents at a “legendary rate.”142 Through 
June 6, 2016, approximately two years after the Alice decision, 
seventy percent of motions in federal courts claiming patent 
invalidity as a defense succeeded.143 Furthermore, as compared to 
the four years prior to the Alice decision, district courts have 
                                                                                                             
137 See, e.g., Kapur et al., supra note 6 (opining that since the Alice decision came down 
one year ago, “the world of computer software patents has been upended”); Uncertainty 
Looms Over Software Patents, WHITEFORD, TAYLOR & PRESTON LLP (June 17, 2015), 
http://www.wtplaw.com/documents/2015/06/uncertainty-looms-over-software-patents 
[https://perma.cc/2BV9-DVXJ] (explaining that the USPTO has struggled for “clarity and 
consistency in establishing patent eligibility for software related patents” and that 
“technological innovation hangs in limbo, as patents for software related inventions are 
being deemed ineligible at an excessive rate”). 
138 See, e.g., Richard S. Gruner, Intangible Inventions: Patentable Subject Matter for an 
Information Age, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 355, 451–53 (2002) (arguing that patentable 
subject matter should have the following four features: (1) “[a]n innovation filling a user 
need with identifiable value”; (2) “[t]he innovation fills a need that is shared by more 
than a few potential users”; (3) “[t]he innovation meets the need through [sic] regular 
operations that produce consistent results”; and (4) “[t]he innovation and the results it 
achieves can be described clearly and distinctly, permitting effective evaluation of the 
innovation”); Michael Risch, Everything is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 591 (2008) 
(arguing that “any invention that satisfies the Patent Act’s requirements of category, 
utility, novelty, nonobviousness, and specification is patentable”). 
139 See Robert R. Sachs, Two Years After Alice: A Survey of the Impact of a Minor Case 
(Part 1), FENWICK & WEST: BILSKIBLOG (June 16, 2016), http://www.bilskiblog.com
/blog/2016/06/two-years-after-alice-a-survey-of-the-impact-of-a-minor-case.html#_ftn14 
[https://perma.cc/A9UU-6KQH]. 
140 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012). 
141 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011). 
142 Hudnell, supra note 7. 
143 See Sachs, supra note 139. 
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decided over four times as many patentable subject matter 
invalidity defenses in the two years since the decision.144 
Because the Alice decision is very recent145 and invalidity 
challenges have become such a prevalent defense in patent 
litigation,146 it is vital to understand how Federal Circuit judges 
contemplate patentable subject matter eligibility to craft the best 
strategies to argue for or against patentability. This Note examines 
each Federal Circuit judge’s approach to determining patent 
eligibility,147 and then recommends ways to better persuade those 
judges148 to enable litigators to more convincingly argue the 
patentable subject matter issue. 
II. THE STUDY’S PARAMETERS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
JUDGES’ METHODOLOGIES 
This Part defines the parameters and limitations of this Note, 
and then examines the Federal Circuit’s patentable subject matter 
jurisprudence. More specifically, Section II.A explains how this 
Note selected the cases included in this study of the Federal 
Circuit’s patentable subject matter case law, and then discloses the 
limitations of the study. Section II.B reviews the cases included in 
the study, judge-by-judge, and identifies trends in the judges’ 
approaches to determining whether a patent claims patentable 
subject matter. 
                                                                                                             
144 Id. 
145 Alice was decided less than four years ago from the date when this Note was being 
written. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
146 See Kenneth Adamo, Comment in Where Do We Stand One Year After Alice, 
LAW360 (June 17, 2016, 8:27 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/668773 
[https://perma.cc/ETQ2-Z9BS] (quoting Kenneth Adamo, Partner at Kirkland & Ellis 
LLP, saying that the Alice decision has become as prominent of a “defensive tool of 
choice” as the USPTO’s new inter partes review proceeding, and that the invalidity 
challenge will continue to be a quick and effective tool). 
147 See infra Section II.B. 
148 See infra Section III.A. 
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A. Case Selection, Analysis Methodology, and Limitations on the 
Study of the Federal Circuit’s Patentable Subject Matter 
Jurisprudence 
To select cases, the Author of this Note first conducted a 
thorough and tailored search. The Author sought out all Federal 
Circuit cases that cited to section 101, limiting the search to 
decisions after Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, Inc. through 
April 2017. Finally, the Author reviewed each case and selected 
those that evaluated whether the invention was directed to an 
abstract idea. However, this Note excludes from the study any 
cases where the judge was not a Federal Circuit Judge (e.g., a 
judge who sat by designation149 upon the Federal Circuit), where 
the decision was written per curium,150 or when the judge had 
authored only one decision. 
After the selection of cases, the Author then turned to 
analyzing those selected. The Author groups cases together 
according to the authoring judge and analyzes each case’s 
reasoning to determine what factors the judge relied upon in 
executing each Alice step. For example, under the first Alice step, 
some judges looked at the claimed invention’s long history,151 
while others noted its similarity to precedent.152 Moreover, in the 
Alice step-two analysis, some judges evaluated whether the 
claimed steps and equipment were generic or conventional,153 
while others focused the claimed invention’s potential to preempt 
                                                                                                             
149 See 28 U.S.C. § 292(a) (1982) (“The chief judge of a circuit may designate and 
assign one or more district judges within the circuit to sit upon the court of appeals or a 
division thereof whenever the business of that court so requires.”). 
150 See generally FED. CIR. R. OF P. 36 (governing a “judgment of Affirmance Without 
Opinion”); Glossary, U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov
/content/glossary.php [https://perma.cc/RX8J-LK5J] (last visited June 24, 2017) (“Latin, 
meaning ‘for the court.’ In appellate courts, often refers to an unsigned opinion.”); Rachel 
Hughey, How to Get to Federal Circuit Rule 36, LAW360 (July 29, 2015, 10:19 AM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/684264/how-to-get-to-federal-circuit-rule-36 
[https://perma.cc/UW6Y-VPYY] (providing a more in-depth discussion of Federal 
Circuit Rule 36). 
151 See, e.g., infra Sections II.B.1.a–b. 
152 See, e.g., infra Sections II.B.1.c–d. 
153 See, e.g., infra Section II.B.1.b. 
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basic scientific tools.154 Often, a judge relied on multiple factors.155 
For each judge, this Note details their reasoning, and then reviews 
the cases’ reasoning for trends. This analysis results in discernable 
trends for some judges and vague outlines for others. However, the 
analysis is limited by the available body of law. 
The small body of law available imposed some limitations on 
this study. First, Alice was decided less than three years before the 
most recent case this Note analyzes was decided, which means the 
judges have not decided many cases under it, relatively 
speaking.156 While some judges have decided several cases, others 
have decided only a couple, and still others have decided one or no 
decisions.157 Furthermore, because the judges have had limited 
opportunities to decide this issue, they may not have fully 
solidified their approaches and may change them in the future.158 
However, this Note defines trends in Federal Circuit judges’ 
approaches thus far. Second, other variables likely influence the 
judges’ approaches, such as the technology involved. Therefore, an 
attorney arguing before the Federal Circuit on this issue must also 
consider how the judges have previously reasoned in cases 
involving the same technology and not solely rely on the judges’ 
general approaches described herein. 
B. The Judges’ Approaches 
Based on the results of the aforementioned analysis, this Note 
then grouped the judges into two groups: judges who employ a 
consistent methodology and judges who are developing their 
methodology. Consistent judges have written multiple decisions 
and their reasoning throughout those decisions is similar. Judges 
developing their methodologies, on the other hand, have written 
multiple decisions, but the factors considered in their reasoning in 
those cases did not agree. 
                                                                                                             
154 See, e.g., infra Section II.B.1.a. 
155 See infra Section II.B. 
156 The Alice decision was announced on June 19, 2014. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank 
Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
157 This Note cannot discern trends for judges who authored one or no decisions, and 
therefore, this Note does not discuss the decisions written by these judges. 
158 See infra Section II.B.2. 
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1. Judges Employing Consistent Approaches 
This Note argues that some Federal Circuit judges have 
developed consistent methodologies to determine whether a patent 
claimed patentable subject matter. For example, despite the 
relatively limited number of cases the Federal Circuit has decided 
regarding an abstract idea’s subject matter eligibility, four Federal 
Circuit judges—Raymond T. Chen, Richard G. Taranto, Todd M. 
Hughes, and Kara F. Stoll—have decided multiple cases by 
consistently applying their own approach. 
a. Judge Raymond T. Chen 
i. Judge Chen’s Decisions 
Judge Chen159 has written decisions in four cases on this topic 
and has developed a consistent methodology.160 As will be seen, 
under step one, Judge Chen asks whether the claimed process has 
been long-prevalent. Then, under step two, he asks whether the 
steps and components are conventional or generic, and 
occasionally whether the claim’s scope is sufficiently narrowed. 
Judge Chen first decided DDR Holdings, L.L.C. v. Hotels.com, 
L.P.161 There, the Federal Circuit considered whether a patent 
claiming a “system [that] generates and directs [a website] visitor 
to a composite web page that displays product information from [a] 
third-party merchant, but retains the host website’s ‘look and feel’” 
claimed patentable subject matter.162 Under Alice step one, Judge 
Chen noted that the claimed invention was not a mathematical 
algorithm or a long-prevalent commercial practice.163 Judge 
Chen’s step-one analysis here asked both whether the practice has 
                                                                                                             
159 Judge Chen was appointed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 2013 
by President Barack Obama and, prior to his appointment, Judge Chen was the Deputy 
General Counsel for Intellectual Property Law, and Solicitor at the USPTO from 2008 to 
2013. Raymond T. Chen, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/raymond-t-chen [https://perma.cc/67T7-94HU] (last 
visited June 24, 2017). 
160 See infra Sections II.B.1.a.i–ii. 
161 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
162 Id. at 1248–49. 
163 Id. at 1257. 
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been long prevalent, and indirectly compared it to Supreme Court 
precedent in Gottschalk and Bilski.164 As Judge Chen developed 
his methodology, as demonstrated below, he focused his Alice 
step-one inquiry on whether the practice is long prevalent. 
Ultimately in DDR, Judge Chen commented that discerning 
whether a claim is directed to an abstract idea is very difficult.165 
Judge Chen then deferred to Alice step two because, regardless of 
how the abstract idea was described, under Alice step two, he could 
identify an inventive concept.166 
Under Alice step two, Judge Chen found that the claimed steps 
were unconventional, explaining that conventionally when an 
advertisement is displayed on a website, and a website visitor 
clicks the advertisement, he or she leaves the original website and 
is transported to a third party’s website.167 On the other hand, 
DDR’s claimed steps transported the website visitor to a hybrid 
webpage with the look and feel of the original website, but still 
allowed the visitor to access the third-party website’s content, 
thereby minimizing the number of visitors lost to other websites.168 
Next, Judge Chen explained that the claimed invention did not 
preempt every application of increasing sales by making websites 
appear similar—only a “specific way” to create a composite 
website to solve a problem particular to the internet.169 Thus, Judge 
Chen held that the patent contained an inventive concept, and was 
not invalid.170 
A few weeks later, Judge Chen decided another case 
challenging a patent as claiming patent-ineligible subject matter in 
Content Extraction & Transmission L.L.C. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
National Association.171 The challenged claimed invention was a 
method of scanning, recognizing, and storing specific data from 
                                                                                                             
164 See id. 
165 See id. at 1255, 1257. 
166 See id. at 1257. 
167 See id. 
168 See id. at 1257–58. 
169 Id. at 1259. 
170 Id. 
171 See 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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hard copy documents.172 Judge Chen agreed with the district court 
decision that process was “undisputedly” well-known.173 Indeed, 
people had always performed those functions.174 Therefore, Judge 
Chen concluded that the claimed invention was directed to an 
abstract idea.175 
Under step two, Judge Chen found that the claimed invention 
did not contain an inventive concept.176 First, Content Extraction 
conceded that scanning the documents was well-known at the time 
it filed the patent.177 Second, Judge Chen rejected Content 
Extraction’s argument that their application was limited to a 
technological environment, countering that precedent had held 
such an imposed limitation “insufficient to save a claim in this 
context.”178 Thus, Judge Chen held that the claimed invention did 
not contain an inventive concept, and therefore the patent  
was invalid.179 
Judge Chen next faced this issue in BASCOM Global Internet 
Services v. AT&T Mobility, Corp.,180 where the court considered 
whether a patent claiming a process “provid[ing] individually 
customizable filtering at [a] remote ISP server” claimed patent-
eligible subject matter.181 Judge Chen agreed with the district court 
                                                                                                             
172 See id. at 1345. 
173 Id. at 1347. 
174 See id. (pointing out that “banks ha[d], for some time, reviewed checks, recognized 
relevant data such as the amount, account number, and identity of account holder, and 
stored that information in their records”). 
175 See id. at 1347–48. 
176 See id. at 1348. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 See id. at 1347–48, 1351. 
180 See 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
181 Id. at 1344. In the “filtering content” process:  
[T]he ISP server receives a request to access a website, associates the 
request with a particular user, and identifies the requested website. 
The filtering tool then applies the filtering mechanism associated 
with the particular user to the requested website to determine whether 
the user associated with that request is allowed access to the website. 
The filtering tool returns either the content of the website to the user, 
or a message to the user indicating that the request was denied.  
Id. at 1345. 
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that “filtering content [was] an abstract idea because it [was] a 
longstanding, well-known method of organizing human 
behavior . . . .”182 He also noted that filtering content was similar to 
other inventions that the Federal Circuit found directed to an 
abstract idea.183 Then, Judge Chen commented on how challenging 
it is to discern what an invention is directed to and deferred to 
Alice step two for considering the specific claim limitations.184 
Under step two, he found an inventive concept because the 
steps’ order was unconventional.185 Judge Chen agreed with the 
district court that none of the steps alone constituted an inventive 
concept, but disagreed with the district court that the steps as an 
ordered combination did not contain an inventive concept.186 He 
found that, because BASCOM’s invention filtered at a remote 
location as opposed to a central location, and therefore in different 
order than the conventional process, the claimed invention 
contained an inventive concept.187 He also noted that the claims 
did not preempt any way of filtering internet content, but instead, 
recited “a specific, discrete implementation” of the abstract idea,188 
and upheld the patent.189 
Finally, the most recent decision Judge Chen authored on this 
topic was Synopsis, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.190 There, the 
patent claimed a type of “logic circuit design process.”191 Judge 
Chen concluded that the design process was a mental process, i.e., 
something that humans do.192 Therefore, he held that the claimed 
invention was directed to an abstract idea.193 In his Alice step-two 
analysis, he found that the steps were directed to a mental process 
                                                                                                             
182 Id. at 1348. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 1349. 
185 See id. at 1350. 
186 See id. at 1349–50. 
187 See id. at 1350. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 1352. 
190 839 F.3d 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
191 Id. at 1139. 
192 See id. at 1139. 
193 Id. at 1151. 
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and did not “introduce a technical advance or improvement.”194 
Therefore, he held that the claimed invention did not contain an 
inventive concept and that the patent was invalid.195 
ii. Summary of Judge Chen’s Approach 
In the above review of Judge Chen’s decisions, Judge Chen 
consistently approached the question of whether a patent claimed 
patent-eligible subject matter. In the Alice step-one analysis, he 
inquired whether the claimed invention was a long-prevalent 
practice.196 Under Alice step two, he inquired whether the claimed 
invention’s steps were conventional, and occasionally whether the 
claim’s scope was sufficiently limited.197 
b. Judge Richard G. Taranto 
i. Judge Taranto’s Decisions 
Judge Taranto198 takes the same approach as Judge Chen, and 
has written two decisions on patentable subject matter.199 Judge 
Taranto’s first post-Alice decision was buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, 
Inc., where the court considered whether a patent claiming 
“methods and machine-readable media encoded to perform steps 
for guaranteeing a party’s performance of its online transaction” 
claimed patentable subject matter.200 Judge Taranto concluded that 
the process created a contractual relationship, which was “beyond 
question of ancient lineage,” and held that the claimed invention 
was directed to an abstract idea.201 
                                                                                                             
194 Id. at 1152. 
195 Id. 
196 See supra Section II.B.1.a.i. 
197 See supra Section II.B.1.a.i. 
198 Judge Taranto was appointed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 2013 
by President Barack Obama and, prior to his appointment, he practiced law at Farr & 
Taranto. Richard G. Taranto, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/richard-g-taranto [https://perma.cc/9VTV-CFKF] 
(last visited June 24, 2017). 
199 See Elec. Power Grp., L.L.C. v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 
buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
200 buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1351. 
201 Id. at 1355. 
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Under step two of Alice, Judge Taranto noted that the steps 
were generic, including the claimed computer.202 Then, he rejected 
that limiting the claimed invention’s application to online 
transactions was sufficient to save the claim because precedent 
specifically denied that assertion.203 Therefore, he held the  
patent invalid.204 
Nearly two years later, Judge Taranto wrote another decision 
deciding whether a patent claimed an abstract idea. In Electric 
Power Group, L.L.C. v. Alstom S.A., the court considered whether 
a patent claiming systems and methods for monitoring electric 
power grids by collecting data, analyzing it, and displaying the 
results claimed patentable subject matter.205 Judge Taranto 
concluded that the claimed invention was a mental process, which 
the Federal Circuit has held to be an abstract idea.206 Thus, Judge 
Taranto held the claimed invention directed to an abstract idea.207 
Under step two, Judge Taranto noted that “limiting the claim[] 
to the particular technological environment” did not transform the 
abstract idea into a patent-eligible application of the abstract 
idea.208 Next, he concluded that the steps were ordinary because 
the claimed invention was no different from the mental process and 
did not recite anything innovative.209 Therefore, Judge Taranto 
concluded that the claimed invention would preempt every 
application of the abstract idea and was not a specific application 
of the abstract idea.210 Thus, he held the patent invalid.211 
 
                                                                                                             
202 See id. 
203 See id. 
204 See id. 
205 See Elec. Power Grp., L.L.C. v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
206 See id. at 1353–54. 
207 See id. at 1354. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 1355 (explaining that the claimed invention failed to provide an “inventive set 
of components or methods . . . that would generate new data” to “invoke any assertedly 
inventive programming” to involve an unconventional ordering of steps, or to use any 
unconventional equipment). 
210 See id. at 1355–56. 
211 See id. at 1356. 
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ii. Summary of Judge Taranto’s Approach 
In summary, while Judge Taranto has written only two 
decisions on the matter, his approach was relatively defined. Under 
the first step of Alice, Judge Taranto asked whether the claimed 
invention was a long-prevalent practice.212 In his step-two analysis, 
he asked whether the claimed steps were conventional and the 
claimed components were generic, and occasionally whether the 
claimed invention’s scope was sufficiently narrow.213 
c. Judge Todd M. Hughes 
i. Judge Hughes’ Decisions 
Judge Hughes214 takes a different approach than Judges Chen 
and Taranto. Instead of asking whether the invention was a long-
standing practice under Alice step one, Judge Hughes compares the 
instant invention to the Supreme Court’s and the Federal Circuit’s 
precedents. Under Alice step two, Judge Hughes examines whether 
the claimed steps are conventional and the claimed components  
are generic. 
Judge Hughes has written five decisions deciding patentable 
subject matter eligibility.215 The first post-Alice decision he wrote 
on this topic was Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, a non-
precedential216 decision.217 There, the court considered whether a 
                                                                                                             
212 See id. at 1353–54; buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed.  
Cir. 2014). 
213 See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1355; buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1354. 
214 Judge Hughes was appointed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 2013 
by President Barack Obama and, prior to his appointment, he was the Deputy Director of 
the Commercial Litigation Branch of the Civil Division of the U.S. Department of 
Justice. Todd. M. Hughes, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR FED. THE CIRCUIT, 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/todd-m-hughes [https://perma.cc/GE5K-PNSD] 
(last visited June 24, 2017). 
215 See TDE Petroleum Data Sols., Inc. v. AKM Enter., Inc., 657 Fed. App’x 991 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016); In re TLI Commc’ns LLC, 823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, L.L.C. v. 
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 
788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, No. 2013-1663 (Fed. 
Cir. Aug. 26, 2014). 
216 Although this case as well as others later discussed are non-precedential, they are 
still indicative of the author’s approach to deciding patentable subject matter  
eligibility decisions. 
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patent claiming a computer-aided management of bingo games 
claimed patentable subject matter.218 Judge Hughes first noted that 
the patents simply computerized a mental process.219 Next, Judge 
Hughes compared the claims at issue with those found ineligible in 
Bilski and Alice, concluding that they were analogous, and held the 
claimed invention directed to an abstract idea.220 Turning to Judge 
Hughes’ Alice step-two analysis, he noted that the claim recited a 
generic computer and the computer’s function was purely 
conventional.221 Therefore, he held the patent invalid.222 
While Judge Hughes relied on both mental process and 
comparing to precedent in Planet Bingo under his Alice step-one 
analysis, his ultimate approach focuses more on precedential 
comparison, as he did in OIP Technologies, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 
Inc.223 In OIP Technologies, the Federal Circuit analyzed a patent 
claiming “a method of price optimization in an e-commerce 
environment.”224 Judge Hughes found the claimed invention 
similar to the “fundamental economic concepts” in the Supreme 
Court’s and Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence.225 Therefore, Judge 
Hughes held the claimed invention was directed to an  
abstract idea.226 
Under his step-two analysis, Judge Hughes focused on whether 
the claimed invention’s steps or computer were conventional, 
concluding that they were.227 He explained that the steps the 
                                                                                                             
217 Planet Bingo, slip op. at 1. 
218 See id. slip op. at 2. 
219 See id. slip op. at 3–4. 
220 See id. slip op. at 5 (discussing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) and 
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2356–57 (2014)). 
221 See id. slip op. at 6. 
222 See id. slip op. at 6–7. 
223 See 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
224 Id. at 1360. 
225 Id. at 1362–63. Specifically, Judge Hughes cited to Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank 
International, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357 (2014), Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 
(2010), Content Extraction & Transmission L.L.C. v. Wells Fargo Bank, National 
Association, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014), Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, L.L.C., 
772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014), and Accenture Global Services, GmbH v. Guidewire 
Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Id. 
226 See OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1362–63. 
227 Id. at 1364. 
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computer executed were “well-understood, routine, conventional 
activit[ies] previously known to the industry.”228 He also noted that 
the claims’ scopes were “exceptionally broad” and implementing 
them on a computer minimally limited their scopes.229 Thus, Judge 
Hughes held the patent did not contain an inventive concept and 
was therefore invalid.230 
Next, Judge Hughes wrote the first decision finding a claimed 
software invention not directed to an abstract idea in Enfish, L.L.C. 
v. Microsoft, Corp.231 The claimed invention was a “self-
referential” database.232 Judge Hughes distinguished the claimed 
invention from precedent, finding that the instant claims focused 
on improving the computer’s functionality.233 He further explained 
that the claims were “specifically directed to a self-referential table 
for a computer database.”234 Accordingly, Judge Hughes held that 
the claimed invention was not invalid because it was not directed 
to an abstract idea.235 
Five days later, Judge Hughes again authored a decision 
concerning patentable subject matter eligibility. In re TLI 
Communications LLC examined a patent claiming “a method and 
system for taking, transmitting, and organizing digital images.”236 
                                                                                                             
228 Id. at 1363 (alteration in original) (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359). 
229 Id. 
230 See id. at 1364. 
231 See 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
232 Id. at 1330. The patents at issue:  
[A]re directed to an innovative logical model for a computer 
database. A logical model is a model of data for a computer database 
explaining how the various elements of information are related to one 
another. A logical model generally results in the creation of particular 
tables of data, but it does not describe how the bits and bytes of those 
tables are arranged in physical memory devices. Contrary to 
conventional logical models, the patented logical model includes all 
data entities in a single table, with column definitions provided by 
rows in that same table. The patents describe this as the ‘self-
referential’ property of the database.  
Id. 
233 See id. at 1336. 
234 Id. at 1337 (emphasis in original). 
235 See id. at 1339. Note that because Judge Hughes found that the claimed invention 
was not directed to an abstract idea, he did not reach the second step of Alice. See id. 
236 823 F.3d 607, 609 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
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Judge Hughes first distinguished the claimed invention from the 
invention in Enfish, concluding that the claimed invention was 
directed to using “conventional or generic technology in a . . . 
well-known environment.”237 Judge Hughes then distinguished the 
instant invention from the invention in Diamond v. Diehr because 
the claimed invention was “not directed to . . . sol[ving a] . . . 
technological problem.”238 Finally, Judge Hughes analogized the 
instant invention to other precedent, finding them similar,239 and 
concluded that TLI’s claimed invention was directed to an abstract 
idea.240 Under step two, Judge Hughes examined each component 
to determine whether the component itself or its function was an 
inventive concept and concluded that the functions and 
components were conventional.241 Therefore, he held the  
patent invalid.242 
The most recent decision Judge Hughes authored, TDE 
Petroleum Data Solutions, Inc. v. AKM Enterprises,243 followed 
the same approach as his previous decisions. In TDE Petroleum 
Data Solutions, the Federal Circuit determined whether a patent 
claiming “processing sensor data on an oil well drill” claimed 
patentable subject matter.244 Judge Hughes compared the instant 
invention to the invention in Electric Power Group, and held that 
precedent clearly supported that the data collection and processing 
claim were directed to an abstract idea.245 In his search for an 
inventive concept under Alice step two, Judge Hughes found that 
there was nothing in the steps themselves or in their ordered 
                                                                                                             
237 Id. at 612. 
238 Id. at 613 (referencing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981)). 
239 Id. (analogizing the instant invention specifically to the abstract idea inventions in 
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010), Intellectual Ventures I L.L.C. v. Capital One 
Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015), OIP Technologies, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 
Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and Content Extraction & Transmission 
L.L.C. v. Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). 
240 See id. 
241 Id. at 613–15. 
242 Id. at 615. 
243 657 Fed. App’x 991 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
244 Id. at 992. 
245 Id. at 993 (citing Elec. Power Grp., L.L.C v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 
(Fed. Cir. 2016)). 
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combination that constituted an inventive concept, and that the 
claimed component’s functions were conventional.246 He therefore 
held the patent invalid.247 
ii. Summary of Judge Hughes’ Approach 
In sum, Judge Hughes’ approach is identifiable from his five 
decisions. First, under step one, Judge Hughes compared the 
invention at hand to the Supreme Court’s and Federal Circuit’s 
precedent to determine whether the claimed invention was directed 
to an abstract idea.248 Then, under step two, he asked whether the 
claimed invention’s components were generic and whether the 
steps were conventional.249 
d. Judge Kara F. Stoll 
i. Judge Stoll’s Decisions 
Judge Stoll takes a similar approach as Judge Hughes. Judge 
Stoll250 has authored two decisions determining whether a patent 
claiming software claimed patent eligible subject matter.251 In her 
first authored decision, In re Smith, the Federal Circuit considered 
whether a patent claiming “a wagering game utilizing real or 
virtual standard playing cards” claimed patentable subject 
matter.252 Judge Stoll analogized the claimed invention to the 
invention in Alice, concluding that a wagering game was 
essentially a “fundamental economic practice”253 because the 
players effectively exchanged and resolved financial obligations 
                                                                                                             
246 Id. at 993. 
247 Id. at 994. 
248 See supra Section II.B.1.c.i. 
249 See supra Section II.B.1.c.i. 
250 Judge Stoll was appointed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 2014 by 
President Barack Obama and, prior to her appointment, she practiced law at Finnegan, 
Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner. See Kara Fernandez Stoll, Circuit Judge, COURT 
OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/kara-farnandez-
stoll-circuit-judge [https://perma.cc/TS4K-RMAN] (last visited June 24, 2017). 
251 See FairWarning IP, L.L.C. v. Iatric Sys., 839 F.3d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2016); In re 
Smith, 815 F.3d 816 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
252 In re Smith, 815 F.3d at 817. 
253 Id. at 818 (quoting Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2356 (2014)). 
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through the game.254 She then compared it to other precedent, 
finding the claimed invention to be similar to claims held to be 
directed to abstract ideas, and consequently held the claimed 
invention directed to an abstract idea.255 Next, in her search for an 
inventive concept, Judge Stoll explained that shuffling physical 
playing cards did not, as Smith argued, supply an inventive 
concept because it was a conventional activity.256 Therefore, she 
held that the patent claimed patent-ineligible subject matter.257 
Judge Stoll next authored a decision in FairWarning IP, L.L.C. 
v. Iatric Systems, Inc. where the Federal Circuit decided whether a 
patent claiming “ways to detect fraud and misuse by identifying 
unusual patterns in users’ access of sensitive data” claimed patent 
eligible subject matter.258 Judge Stoll first compared the claimed 
invention to the Federal Circuit’s precedent, concluding that the 
claimed invention was essentially a combination of three 
precedents, all of which were found to be directed to abstract ideas 
in Electric Power Group.259 Next, Judge Stoll distinguished the 
instant case from McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America, 
Inc.,260 concluding that FairWarning’s invention implemented an 
old practice, whereas McRo’s invention applied a new practice.261 
Similarly, Judge Stoll distinguished FairWarning’s invention from 
the Enfish invention, pointing out that FairWarning’s invention 
was not directed to improving a computer’s functioning as was the 
case with Enfish’s invention.262 Judge Stoll thus held that the 
claimed invention was directed to an abstract idea.263 
                                                                                                             
254 See id. at 818–19. 
255 See id. at 819 (comparing the instant invention to Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 
3230–21 (2010), OIP Technologies, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 
2015), and Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 Fed. App’x 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). 
256 See id. 
257 See id. at 819–20. 
258 839 F.3d 1089, 1091–92 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
259 Id. at 1093–94 (citing Elec. Power Grp., L.L.C. v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 
(Fed. Cir. 2016)). 
260 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
261 See FairWarning IP, 839 F.3d at 1094–95. 
262 See id. at 1095 (citing Enfish, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336–37 
(Fed. Cir. 2016)). 
263 See id. 
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Judge Stoll then conducted a thorough search for an inventive 
concept under Alice step two. First, Judge Stoll rejected 
FairWarning’s argument that the use of a user interface and 
microprocessor conveyed an inventive concept because precedent 
had categorized both of those components as generic computer 
elements that did not convey inventive concepts.264 Next, Judge 
Stoll rejected another FairWarning argument that the claimed 
invention’s ability to combine various data sources and formats 
conveyed an inventive concept, once again relying on precedent, 
and therefore the functionality did not provide an inventive 
concept.265 Finally, Judge Stoll distinguished FairWarning’s 
claimed invention from the invention in DDR, concluding that it 
did not solve a problem unique to computer technology and that 
limiting the application to computers did not provide an inventive 
concept.266 Thus, Judge Stoll held the patent invalid.267 
ii. Summary of Judge Stoll’s Approach 
To summarize Judge Stoll’s methodology, she compared the 
claimed invention to the Supreme Court’s and Federal Circuit’s 
precedent when deciding whether it was directed to an abstract 
idea.268 Then, in her search for an inventive concept under step 
two, she evaluated whether the claimed steps were conventional 
and the components were generic.269 
e. Summary of Consistent Judges 
In conclusion, these four judges had consistent methodologies 
to determine whether a patent claims patent-eligible subject matter. 
Under the first step of the Alice test, there were two approaches. 
Judges Chen and Taranto asked whether the invention was a long-
                                                                                                             
264 See id. at 1096. 
265 See id. at 1096–97. The precedent provided that “merely selecting information, by 
content or source, for collection, analysis, and [announcement] does nothing significant 
to differentiate a process from ordinary mental processes.” Id. at 1097 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Elec. Power Grp., L.L.C. v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1355). 
266 See id at 1096–97. 
267 See id. at 1098. 
268 See id. at 1093–95; In re Smith, 815 F.3d 816, 818–19 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
269 See FairWarning IP, 839 F.3d at 1095–97; In re Smith, 815 F.3d at 819. 
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prevalent practice, while Judges Hughes and Stoll compared the 
instant claimed invention to the Supreme Court’s and Federal 
Circuit’s precedents. For the second step of the Alice test, however, 
all four judges followed a similar methodology: asking whether the 
claimed steps were unconventional or the components were not 
generic. The only exception to this general guideline was that 
Judges Chen and Taranto also occasionally examined whether the 
claimed scope was sufficiently limited under Alice step two. 
2. Judges Developing Their Methodologies 
While Judges Chen, Taranto, Hughes and Stoll have decided 
several cases and have defined a methodology for determining 
whether a patent claims patentable subject matter, others have not 
precisely outlined their approaches yet. In this Part, this Note 
examines decisions by Judges Plager, Reyna, Bryson, Prost, 
Lourie, and Newman to identify trends within their approaches 
despite their varying approaches within those decisions. 
a. Judge S. Jay Plager 
i. Judge Plager’s Decisions 
Judge Plager270 first wrote a decision concerning patentable 
subject matter in Versata Development Group, Inc. v. SAP 
America, Inc., where the court considered whether patents 
claiming a “WHO/WHAT” pricing method claimed patentable 
subject matter.271 Judge Plager compared Versata’s claimed 
inventions to precedent, finding them similar to the inventions held 
directed to abstract ideas in Alice and Bilski, and ultimately 
concluded that Versata’s claimed inventions are directed to the 
abstract idea of price determination.272 He also noted that a patent 
on price determination would preempt a foundational idea, and that 
                                                                                                             
270 Judge Plager was appointed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1989 
by President George H. W. Bush and, prior to his appointment, he served in the 
Executive Office of the President. S. Jay Plager, COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. 
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/s-jay-plager-circuit-judge [https://perma.cc
/5NGC-5L93] (last visited June 24, 2017). 
271 See 793 F.3d 1306, 1311–13 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
272 See id. at 1333. 
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Federal Circuit precedent had held similar claims directed to 
abstract ideas.273 Thus he held the claimed invention directed to an 
abstract idea.274 
Moving to step two, Judge Plager examined the claimed 
inventions and concluded that when taken either individually or as 
an ordered combination, the claims recited only conventional 
steps.275 He further explained that Versata’s invention was similar 
to other cases in which the Federal Circuit found that the 
inventions lacked an inventive concept,276 and was distinguishable 
from DDR.277 Judge Plager therefore held the patent invalid.278 
Judge Plager’s second case concerning patentable subject 
matter eligibility was Amdocs (Israel.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, 
Inc., where the court decided the validity of several related patents 
claiming essentially the same system allowing “network service 
providers to account for and bill for internet protocol (‘IP’) 
network communications.”279 Judge Plager did not delve into 
whether the claims were directed to an abstract idea because he 
opined that even if he were to agree with the district court’s 
determination that the inventions were so directed, the patent 
claims still contained an inventive concept, and therefore claimed 
patentable subject matter.280 Judge Plager found an inventive 
concept in that the claimed inventions allowed de-centralized 
processing of information, whereas the conventional process 
claimed centralized processing.281 Therefore, even though the 
                                                                                                             
273 See id. at 1333–34. 
274 See id. at 1333. 
275 See id. at 1334. 
276 See id. Specifically, Judge Plager found the claimed invention similar to those held 
directed to an abstract idea in Content Extraction & Transmission L.L.C. v. Wells Fargo 
Bank, National Association, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014), Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, 
L.L.C., 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014), buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 
(Fed. Cir. 2014), Bancorp Services, L.L.C. v. Sun Life Insurance Co. of Canada, 687 F.3d 
1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012), and CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366 
(Fed. Cir. 2011). 
277 See Versata, 793 F.3d at 1334. 
278 See id. at 1336. 
279 841 F.3d 1288, 1291–93 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
280 See id. at 1300. 
281 See id. at 1300–01. 
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components were generic, they operated unconventionally to 
improve a computer’s functionality.282 He then distinguished the 
instant case from Content Extraction, In re TLI Communications, 
and DigiTech Image Technologies, L.L.C. v. Electronics for 
Imaging, Inc.,283 but found it similar to DDR and BASCOM.284 For 
those reasons, and similar reasons for the other patents, the judge 
held the patents not invalid.285 
ii. Summary of Judge Plager’s Approach 
In summary, because Judge Plager did not need to address the 
first step of the Alice test in Amdocs,286 only one data point exists 
for the judge’s approach to determining whether a claimed 
invention is directed to an abstract idea. Therefore, this Note 
cannot define Judge Plager’s Alice step-one methodology. 
However, Judge Plager consistently analyzed the claimed 
invention under Alice step two in both his decisions; he asked first 
whether the steps were unconventional and the components were 
generic, and then compared the instant case to precedent.287 
b. Judge Jimmie V. Reyna 
i. Judge Reyna’s Decisions 
Judge Reyna288 has authored four decisions deciding whether a 
patent claims patentable subject matter. His first decision, McRO, 
Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America, Inc., held a patent claiming 
“automating part of a preexisting 3–D animation method” not 
                                                                                                             
282 See id. 
283 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
284 Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1300–02. 
285 See id. at 1302, 1304–06. 
286 See id. at 1300. 
287 See id. at 1300–02; Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334 
(Fed. Cir. 2015). 
288 Judge Reyna was appointed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 2011 
by President Barack Obama and was an international trade attorney at Williams Mullen 
prior to his appointment. Jimmie V. Reyna, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. 
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/jimmie-v-reyna-circuit-judge [https://
perma.cc/BB74-KF8W] (last visited June 24, 2017). 
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invalid under Alice step one.289 Judge Reyna noted that the claimed 
invention used a specific set of rules and that it allowed computers 
to produce more realistic and accurate animations that previously 
only humans could create.290 Therefore, Judge Reyna concluded 
that McRO’s claimed invention was not directed to an abstract idea 
and the patent was not invalid.291 
Judge Reyna next authored the Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc. 
opinion and held the claims, both independent and dependent, 
invalid.292 The court analyzed patents claiming one menu that has 
“categories and items, and software that can generate a second 
menu from that first menu by allowing categories and items to be 
selected.”293 Under Alice step one, Judge Reyna found that the 
claimed invention claimed the idea of creating a second menu, not 
a specific way of programming or designing the software to create 
the second menu.294 He also distinguished Ameranth’s invention 
from Enfish.295 Thus, he held the patent claims directed to an 
abstract idea.296 Under step two, Judge Reyna concluded that all 
four of the features Ameranth identified as unconventional were 
“insignificant post-solution activities that do not support the 
invention having an ‘inventive concept.’”297 Therefore, he held 
these claims invalid.298 Judge Reyna applied the same 
methodology to the dependent claims and likewise held  
those invalid.299 
In a non-precedential decision, Judge Reyna again confronted 
the patentable subject matter eligibility issue in Clarilogic, Inc. v. 
FormFree Holdings Corp., where the court decided whether a 
                                                                                                             
289 837 F.3d 1299, 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
290 See id. at 1313. 
291 See id. at 1316. 
292 See 842 F.3d 1229, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
293 Id. at 1234. 
294 See id. at 1241. 
295 See id. (citing Enfish, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335–36 (Fed.  
Cir. 2016)). 
296 See id. 
297 Id. at 1242 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 
66, 73 (2012)). 
298 See id. 
299 See id. at 1243–45. 
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patent claiming “a method for electronically certifying a potential 
borrower’s financial account data and providing a credit report” 
claimed patentable subject matter.300 Under Alice step one, Judge 
Reyna found the instant case analogous to the claim directed to an 
abstract idea in Electric Power Group, and therefore concluded 
that the claimed invention was also directed to an abstract idea.301 
In his Alice step-two analysis, Judge Reyna first distinguished the 
instant case from Diehr because the instant case did not, as 
FormFree claimed, transform something into something else.302 
Judge Reyna then analogized the claimed invention to the 
invention found to lack an inventive concept in Electric Power 
Group, and thus concluded that FormFree’s invention likewise 
lacked an inventive concept.303 Thus, the patent was invalid.304 
Judge Reyna’s most recent authored decision was 
RecogniCorp, L.L.C. v. Nintendo Co., where the court considered 
the validity of a patent claiming a “method and apparatus for 
building a composite facial image using constituent parts.”305 In 
determining whether the claimed invention was directed to an 
abstract idea, Judge Reyna first noted that the method was “an 
abstract concept long utilized to transmit information.”306 Next, he 
distinguished the instant case from Diehr and Enfish, and 
analogized RecogniCorp’s invention to the Digitech invention, 
which was held directed to an abstract idea.307 Thus, he held the 
claimed invention directed to an abstract idea.308 Under step two, 
Judge Reyna found that adding a mathematical equation to change 
data to another form did not provide an inventive concept.309 
Furthermore, Judge Reyna continued, there was no particularized 
application, both because the claim did not require a computer, and 
                                                                                                             
300 No. 2016-1781, slip op. at 2 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2017). 
301 See id. slip op. at 6–7 (citation omitted). 
302 See id. slip op. at 7–8 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981)). 
303 See id. slip op. at 8 (citing Elec. Power Grp., L.L.C. v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 
1353–56 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). 
304 See id. 
305 855 F.3d 1322, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
306 Id. at 1326. 
307 See id. at 1326–27. 
308 See id. at 1326. 
309 See id. at 1328. 
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a person could verbally perform it.310 Therefore, Judge Reyna 
concluded that the claimed invention lacked an inventive concept, 
and held the patent invalid.311 
ii. Summary of Judge Reyna’s Approach 
In sum, Judge Reyna’s approach to determining whether a 
patent claimed patentable subject matter was not consistent 
throughout the decisions. In one case, under Alice step one, Judge 
Reyna looked at whether the patent claimed a result as opposed to 
a way of achieving that result,312 but in other cases he looked at 
whether the practice was long prevalent313 or compared the instant 
case to Federal Circuit precedent.314 Judge Reyna was somewhat 
consistent in his step-two analysis, but not entirely. In one case, he 
examined whether the claimed components and steps were 
conventional or generic.315 In another case, Judge Reyna compared 
the case at hand to precedent.316 In yet another case, Judge Reyna 
decided that the addition of a mathematical formula did not convey 
an inventive concept and that the invention did not require a 
computer for a human to perform the claimed process.317 
Therefore, while there are some discernable trends, Judge Reyna’s 
approach was not the same in every decision. 
c. Judge William C. Bryson 
i. Judge Bryson’s Decisions 
Judge Bryson318 authored two related decisions in Affinity Labs 
of Texas, L.L.C. v. DIRECTV, L.L.C.319 and Affinity Labs of Texas, 
                                                                                                             
310 See id. 
311 See id. 
312 See Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
313 See RecogniCorp, 855 F.3d at 1326; McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 
837 F.3d 1299, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
314 See Clarilogic, Inc. v. FormFree Holdings Corp., No. 2016-1781, slip op. at 6–7 
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2017). 
315 See Apple, 842 F.3d at 1242. 
316 See Clarilogic, slip op. at 8. 
317 See RecogniCorp, 855 F.3d at 1328. 
318 Judge Bryson was appointed by President Bill Clinton in 1994, and was with the 
U.S.  Department of Justice prior to his appointment. William C. Bryson, Circuit Judge, 
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L.L.C. v. Amazon.com Inc.320 In DIRECTV, the court considered 
whether a patent claiming a system and method for “streaming 
regional broadcast signals to cellular telephones located outside the 
region served by the regional broadcaster” claimed patent-eligible 
subject matter.321 Judge Bryson held the claimed invention directed 
to the abstract idea of “providing out-of-region access to regional 
broadcast content,” because it was a long-prevalent practice and 
the claims did not specify a specific way of accomplishing the 
result, only the result itself.322 Furthermore, he explained that 
limiting the application to cellular phones did not sufficiently limit 
the claim scope.323 Finally, he noted that Affinity’s claimed 
invention was similar to the inventions in In re TLI 
Communications and Ultramercial, and distinguishable from those 
in DDR and Enfish.324 Thus, he held the patent claim directed to an 
abstract idea.325 Under step two, Judge Bryson held that the 
claimed invention did not contain an inventive concept because the 
components were conventional and the cellular phones’ functions 
were generic.326 He also noted the similarities between the instant 
case and Ultramercial, Mortgage Grader, and Intellectual 
Ventures, and distinguished the instant case from BASCOM.327 
Thus, he held the patent invalid.328 
Affinity Labs of Texas, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com Inc. focused on 
whether a patent claiming “‘a method for targeted advertising’ in 
which an advertisement is selected for delivery to the user of a 
portable device based on at least one piece of demographic 
information about the user” claimed patent-eligible subject 
                                                                                                             
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges
/william-c-bryson-circuit-judge [https://perma.cc/A4UM-BY53] (last visited June  
26, 2017). 
319 838 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
320 838 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
321 DIRECTV, 838 F.3d at 1255. 
322 Id. at 1258. 
323 See id. at 1258–59. 
324 See id. at 1260–62. 
325 See id. at 1258. 
326 See id. at 1262–63. 
327 See id. at 1263–65. 
328 See id. at 1265. 
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matter.329 To determine whether the claimed invention was 
directed to an abstract idea, Judge Bryson first compared the 
instant invention to the inventions in Ultramercial and In re TLI 
Communications, finding them to be similar.330 He next rejected 
Affinity’s contention that wireless streaming of media was not 
conventional on the application’s filing date, explaining that the 
patent does not claim a specific mechanism for wirelessly 
streaming media, only the function of wirelessly streaming 
media.331 Judge Bryson then distinguished the instant case from 
Enfish, finding that the claimed invention merely added 
conventional components to well-known business practices.332 
Thus, he held the patent claim directed to an abstract idea.333 
Under Alice step two, Judge Bryson noted that the features in the 
claims were described and claimed generically, i.e., not 
specifically enough to demonstrate that the claimed invention 
provided a “concrete solution” to a problem.334 Thus, he held that 
the patent failed to contain an inventive concept and the patent  
was invalid.335 
ii. Summary of Judge Bryson’s Approach 
This Note cannot precisely delineate Judge Bryson’s approach 
from these two cases because his approach was not entirely 
consistent in both decisions, despite the two cases being related. 
However, notably, under both Alice test steps, Judge Bryson 
compared the instant case to precedent.336 However, under step 
one, he also looked at whether it was a long prevalent practice,337 
whether the patent claimed a result or a way to achieve the 
                                                                                                             
329 838 F.3d 1266, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting U.S. Patent No. 8,688,085 (filed Apr. 
1, 2013)). 
330 See id. at 1269. 
331 See id. 
332 See id. at 1270 (quoting Enfish, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1338 
(Fed. Cir. 2016)). 
333 See id. at 1271. 
334 Id. 
335 See id. at 1272. 
336 See Affinity Labs of Tex., L.L.C. v. DIRECTV, L.L.C., 838 F.3d 1253, 1260–62 
(Fed. Cir. 2016); Amazon.com, 838 F.3d at 1269–71. 
337 See DIRECTV, 838 F.3d at 1258; Amazon, 838 F.3d at 1270. 
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result,338 and whether the claims sufficiently limited the patent’s 
preemptive effect.339 Under Alice step two, he also followed the 
same approach as other judges in asking whether the claimed steps 
and the components included therein were generic or 
conventional.340 However, under step two, Judge Bryson also 
compared the instant case to precedent in DIRECTV.341 Therefore, 
although Judge Bryson consistently considered certain factors, the 
exact factors were not consistent in each of his decisions. 
d. Judge Sharon Prost 
i. Judge Prost’s Decisions 
Judge Prost342 has written four decisions regarding patentable 
subject matter. Two of the decisions are non-precedential, and the 
other two are related proceedings. Judge Prost’s first authored 
decision was in Tranxition, Inc. v. Lenovo (United States) Inc., a 
non-precedential decision where the Federal Circuit decided 
whether a patent claiming an automatically migrating 
configuration setting from an old computer to a new computer 
claimed patentable subject matter.343 Under Alice step one, it was 
undisputed that migration of configuration setting was an abstract 
idea.344 Under step two, Judge Prost noted that humans could 
perform the task the patent claimed, and that the steps—taken 
individually or as an ordered combination—failed to provide an 
inventive concept, because they merely recited a generic computer 
                                                                                                             
338 See DIRECTV, 838 F.3d at 1258; Amazon, 838 F.3d at 1269. 
339 See DIRECTV, 838 F.3d at 1258–59. 
340 See id. at 1262–63; Amazon, 838 F.3d at 1271. 
341 See DIRECTV, 838 F.3d at 1263–65. 
342 Judge Prost was appointed to Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit in 2001 by President George W. Bush and served as Minority Chief Counsel, 
Deputy Chief Counsel, and Chief Counsel of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate 
prior to her appointment. Sharon Prost, Chief Judge, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/sharon-prost-chief-judge [https://
perma.cc/ZLJ2-WA6A] (last visited June 26, 2017). 
343 See Nos. 2015-1907, 2015-1941, 2015-1958, slip op. at 2 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 16, 2016). 
344 Id. slip op. at 6. 
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routinely and conventionally performing the abstract idea.345 Thus, 
she held the patent invalid.346 
Her next decision, another non-precedential decision, was 
Smartflash L.L.C. v. Apple Inc.347 There, the court examined a 
patent claiming systems relating to “a portable data carrier for 
storing and paying for data and to computer systems for providing 
access to data to be stored” to determine whether it claimed 
patentable subject matter.348 Because the claims invoked a 
computer only to execute the abstract idea, Judge Prost concluded 
that the claims were directed to an abstract idea.349 Next, Judge 
Prost searched for an inventive concept, noting that both Supreme 
Court and Federal Circuit precedent had held similar data-
processing inventions to lack an inventive concept because the 
activity was routine.350 Second, she analogized the instant 
invention to the invention in Ultramercial, and distinguished it 
from DDR.351 Lastly, Judge Prost concluded that the “interfaces,” 
“program stores,” and “processors” were all generic computer 
components and therefore did not supply an inventive concept.352 
Thus, the patent was invalid because it was directed to an abstract 
idea and lacked an inventive concept.353 
A few weeks after the Smartflash decision, Judge Prost 
released two decisions in related cases: Intellectual Ventures I 
L.L.C. v. Erie Indemnity Co. and Intellectual Ventures I L.L.C. v. 
Capital One Financial Corp. In Erie Indemnity, the court 
considered the validity of U.S. Patent No. 6,510,434 (“‘434 
Patent”) and U.S. Patent No. 6,546,002 (“‘002 Patent).354 The 
Capital One Financial court, on the other hand, evaluated the 
                                                                                                             
345 See id. slip op. at 8. 
346 See id. slip op. at 9. 
347 No. 2016-1059 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 1, 2017). 
348 Id. slip op. at 2–3. 
349 See id. slip op. at 10. 
350 See id. slip op. at 11. 
351 See id. slip op. at 12–13. 
352 Id. slip op. at 14. 
353 See id. 
354 See Intellectual Ventures I L.L.C. v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017). 
156          FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVIII:1 
 
validity of U.S Patent No. 7,984,081 (“‘081 Patent”) and the  
‘002 Patent.355 
In Erie Indemnity, the ‘434 Patent claimed “methods and 
apparatuses that use an index to locate desired information in a 
computer database.”356 First, under Alice step one, Judge Prost 
noted that the type of activity claimed has been long prevalent and 
existed long before computers.357 Next, Judge Prost compared 
Intellectual Ventures’ claimed invention to those found directed to 
an abstract idea in In re TLI Communications, Content Extraction, 
and BASCOM, finding them to be similar.358 Finally the judge 
rejected Intellectual Ventures’ argument that, similar to Enfish, 
their invention improved computer functionality and held the 
claimed invention directed to an abstract idea.359 
Judge Prost then searched for an inventive concept under Alice 
step two. The judge first rejected Intellectual Ventures’ argument 
that using a certain computer language provided an inventive 
concept.360 She opined that limiting the invention to a specific, 
well-known computer language was the same as limiting it to a 
technological environment, which does not provide an inventive 
concept.361 The judge then examined the remaining limitations 
individually and as an ordered combination, and found them to be 
“well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activities.”362 Thus, 
the ‘434 Patent was invalid.363 
Judge Prost then examined the ‘002 Patent, which claimed 
“systems and methods for accessing a user’s remotely stored data 
and files,” and ultimately held the ‘002 Patent invalid.364 Judge 
                                                                                                             
355 See Intellectual Ventures I L.L.C. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1334 
(Fed. Cir. 2017). 
356 Erie Indem., 850 F.3d at 1325. 
357 See id. at 1327. 
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359 See id. at 1327–28 (citing Enfish, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (2016)). 
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362 Id. at 1329 (alteration in original) (quoting Content Extraction & Transmission 
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2017]   PATENTLY INSANE FOR PATENTS 157 
 
Prost first noted that remote access and retrieval of user data is an 
“age-old practice” existing before computers.365 Second, Judge 
Prost rejected Intellectual Ventures’ argument that the claimed 
mobile interface solved a problem unique to the field, opining that 
the mobile interface “does little more than provide a generic 
technological environment to allow users to access information,” 
which was insufficient to cause the invention to be non-abstract.366 
After concluding that the claimed invention was directed to an 
abstract idea, Judge Prost moved to determining whether the 
claimed invention contained an inventive concept.367 Judge Prost 
concluded that using a mobile interface and pointers to retrieve 
user information merely implemented the abstract idea on a 
generic computer.368 Furthermore, because the other components 
and steps recited in the claimed invention were generic or 
conventional, Judge Prost held that the claimed invention did not 
contain an inventive concept, and therefore the patent  
was invalid.369 
In the related case, Capital One Financial, the court considered 
the validity of the ‘081 Patent, which claimed “methods, systems, 
and apparatuses for dynamically managing eXtensible Markup 
Language (‘XML’) data.”370 Under Alice step one, Judge Prost 
found the ‘081 Patent’s invention similar to the inventions found 
directed to an abstract idea in Content Extraction, Intellectual 
Ventures I L.L.C. v. Capital One Bank (USA),371 and Electric 
Power Group.372 As Judge Prost did in Erie Indemnity, she rejected 
Intellectual Ventures’ argument that limiting the application to a 
certain computer language caused the claimed invention to not be 
directed to an abstract idea, opining that limiting an application to 
a technological environment did not transform an abstract idea into 
                                                                                                             
365 Id. at 1330. 
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367 See id. 
368 See id. at 1331. 
369 See id. at 1331–32. 
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a non-abstract idea.373 Finally, Judge Prost concluded that despite 
that the specific structures within the claimed invention provided 
some particularity, the “underlying concept” was still directed to 
an abstract idea.374 Thus, Judge Prost turned to Alice step two to 
investigate whether the claimed invention contained an inventive 
concept.375 The judge examined the steps and components recited 
in the claims both individually and as an ordered combination, and 
concluded that they were generic and conventional.376 Thus, Judge 
Prost held the ‘081 Patent invalid.377 
ii. Summary of Judge Prost’s Approach 
The four cases Judge Prost authored did not clearly define a 
methodology she employed to determine whether a patent claimed 
patentable subject matter. However, this Note recognized some 
trends. In her first two cases, under Alice step one, Judge Prost 
used her own judgement to determine whether something was 
abstract, but in Erie Indemnity and Capital One Financial, she 
used the approach implemented by Judges Chen and Taranto—
asking whether the practice was long prevalent—and also 
compared the instant claimed invention to precedent.378 Judge 
Prost was relatively consistent under the second step of Alice. In all 
four of her decisions, she followed the same approach as most 
other judges this Note addresses: asking whether the components 
and steps claimed were generic or conventional.379 However, she 
also implemented other approaches such as comparing the instant 
                                                                                                             
373 See id. 
374 Id. at 1341. 
375 See id. 
376 See id. at 1342. 
377 See id. Judge Prost cited Intellectual Ventures I, L.L.C. v. Erie Indemnity Co., 850 
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case to precedent.380 Therefore, although some trends were 
recognizable, her approach was not completely defined. 
e. Judge Alan D. Lourie 
i. Judge Lourie’s Decisions 
Judge Lourie381 authored two decisions determining patentable 
subject matter eligibility: Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, L.L.C. and 
Evolutionary Intelligence L.L.C. v. Sprint Nextel Corp. In 
Ultramercial, Judge Lourie considered whether a patent claiming 
“a method for distributing copyrighted media products over the 
Internet where the consumer receives a copyrighted media product 
at no cost in exchange for viewing an advertisement, and the 
advertiser pays for the copyrighted content” claimed patentable 
subject matter.382 Judge Lourie held the claimed invention directed 
to the abstract idea of “using advertising as an exchange or 
currency.”383 He then found no inventive concept because the 
claims merely recited routinely and conventionally implementing 
the abstract idea.384 Thus, Judge Lourie held the patent invalid.385 
Most recently, in the non-precedential Evolutionary 
Intelligence decision, Judge Lourie evaluated whether a patent 
claiming “systems and methods for allowing computers to process 
data that are dynamically modified based upon external-to-the-
device information” claimed patentable subject matter.386 In his 
Alice step-one analysis, Judge Lourie compared the case at hand to 
                                                                                                             
380 See Smartflash, slip op. at 11–13. 
381 Judge Lourie was appointed by President George H. W. Bush in 1990 and was Vice 
President, Corporate Patents and Trademarks, and Associate General Counsel of 
SmithKline Beecham Corporation prior to his appointment. Alan D. Lourie, Circuit 
Judge, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov
/judges/alan-d-lourie-circuit-judge [https://perma.cc/9D8T-EX2L] (last visited Sept.  
19, 2017). 
382 Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, L.L.C., 772 F.3d 709, 712 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
383 See id. at 715. 
384 See id. 
385 See id. at 717. 
386 Evolutionary Intelligence L.L.C. v. Sprint Nextel Corp., Nos. 2016-1188, 2016-
1190, 2016-1191, 2016-1192, 2016-1194, 2016-1195, 2016-1197, 2016-1198, 2016-
1199, slip op. at 3 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 17, 2017). 
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precedent, finding it similar to Affinity Labs of Texas, L.L.C. v. 
Amazon.com Inc. and Electric Power Group, which both held 
similar inventions were directed to an abstract idea, and 
distinguishable from Enfish.387 Therefore, he held the claimed 
invention was directed to an abstract idea.388 Under the Alice step-
two inquiry, Judge Lourie noted that Evolutionary Intelligence had 
conceded that the claimed containers, registers, and gateways “are 
‘conventional and routine’ structures,” and further noted that, when 
taken both individually and as an ordered combination, the 
elements were conventional.389 Therefore, he held that the claimed 
invention lacked an inventive concept and the patent  
was invalid.390 
ii. Summary of Judge Lourie’s Approach 
Judge Lourie’s two decisions did not demonstrate that he has 
an exact methodology to determine whether a claim is directed to 
an abstract idea. In Ultramercial, he pointed to a lack of concrete 
form, while in Evolutionary Intelligence he compared the instant 
case to the Federal Circuit’s precedent.391 However, as with many 
other Federal Circuit judges, Judge Lourie consistently approached 
the Alice step-two inquiry by examining whether the claimed steps 
and components were conventional or generic.392 Therefore, 
although no consistent approach for Judge Lourie for step one was 
apparent, he did consistently approach Alice step two. 
 
                                                                                                             
387 See id. slip op. at 4 (comparing the instant case to Affinity Labs of Tex., L.L.C. v. 
Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2016), Elec. Power Grp., L.L.C. v. 
Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2016), and Enfish, L.L.C. v. Microsoft 
Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). 
388 See id. 
389 Id. (quoting Evolutionary Intelligence L.L.C. v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 137 F. Supp. 
3d 1157, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 2015)). 
390 See id. 
391 Compare Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, L.L.C., 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014), 
with Evolutionary Intelligence, slip op. at 4. 
392 See Evolutionary Intelligence, slip op. at 4; Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715. 
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f. Judge Pauline Newman 
i. Judge Newman’s Decisions 
Judge Newman393 has authored two decisions, one of which 
was non-precedential. Judge Newman first decided Internet 
Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc.,394 which considered whether 
a patent claiming “the use of a conventional web browser Back and 
Forward navigational functionalities without data loss in an online 
application consisting of dynamically generated web pages” 
claimed patentable subject matter.395 Judge Newman first held that 
the claimed invention was directed to an abstract idea because 
Internet Patent Corp. provided in the specification that the “most 
important aspect” of the invention was that it maintained the state 
of the prior page when a user changed pages.396 Judge Newman 
categorized this aspect as a result, rather than specific steps to 
accomplish a result, and therefore the claimed invention was 
directed to an abstract idea.397 Under step two, because Internet 
Patents Corp. admitted in its specification that the Back and 
Forward functionality was conventional and the specification 
described it as “well-known” and “common,” Judge Newman did 
not find an inventive concept, and therefore held the  
patent invalid.398 
Next, Judge Newman decided Trading Technologies 
International, Inc. v. CQG, Inc., a non-precedential decision where 
the court considered whether a patent claiming a method and 
system for electronically trading financial instruments, such as 
stocks and bonds, claimed patentable subject matter.399 Under 
                                                                                                             
393 Judge Newman was appointed by President Ronald Regan in 1984, and was Special 
Advisor to the U.S. Delegation to the Diplomatic Conference on the revision of the Paris 
Convention for the protection of Industrial property prior to her appointment. Pauline 
Newman, Circuit Judge, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc
.uscourts.gov/judges/pauline-newman-circuit-judge [https://perma.cc/DYU8-SGC5] (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2017).  
394 790 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
395 Id. at 1344. 
396 Id. at 1348. 
397 See id. 
398 See id. 
399 See No. 2016-1616, slip op. at 3 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 18, 2017). 
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Alice step one, Judge Newman affirmed the district court’s 
reasoning and concluded that, like the Enfish invention, the instant 
claim was directed to improving computers’ functionality.400 
Because Judge Newman held that the claimed invention was not 
directed to an abstract idea, the court did not reach Alice step two, 
and the court held the patent not invalid.401 
ii. Summary of Judge Newman’s Approach 
Judge Newman’s approach was not clear from these two 
decisions for two reasons. First, she did not take a similar approach 
under Alice step one in the two cases.402 Second, because Judge 
Newman held the patent in Trading Technologies was not directed 
to an abstract idea, she did not reach the second step of the Alice 
test.403 Therefore, there was only one data point on her approach 
under that step, which this Note was therefore unable to draw a 
conclusion from. 
III. LITIGATION STRATEGY AND PREDICTIONS REGARDING THE 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S DIRECTION 
A. Litigator’s Strategy for Briefs and Arguments 
Part of a litigator’s attractiveness to a client is not only his or 
her knowledge of the law, but also his or her ability to persuasively 
advocate for the client. A litigator should know the arguments that 
judges have previously found to be the most persuasive to increase 
the prospects for successful litigation. In this Part, this Note 
outlines how a litigator should argue the patentable subject matter 
issue in light of the foregoing analysis discerning the  
judges’ methodologies. 
The first step is to recognize who the judges are and which 
arguments they have previously found persuasive or not 
                                                                                                             
400 See id. slip op. at 8–9 (citing Enfish, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 
1336, 1339 (2016)). 
401 See id. slip op. at 9. 
402 See supra Section II.B.2.f.i. 
403 See Trading Techs. Int’l, slip op. at 9. 
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persuasive. For example, if the panel includes Judges Chen and 
Taranto, the litigator should argue differently than if the panel 
includes Hughes and Stoll. If the panel consists of judges whose 
methodologies are not as defined as Judges Chen, Taranto, 
Hughes, and Stoll, a litigator should look to the judge’s decisions 
as analyzed above, and then also consider other factors such as the 
technology claimed. That way, a litigator may identify the more 
specific approach of that panel for a specific technology. 
1. Alice Step One 
Litigators can increase their chances of obtaining their desired 
outcome by arguing points the empaneled judges have historically 
found persuasive. Some Federal Circuit judges ask whether the 
claimed invention has been a long prevalent practice, such as 
Judges Chen and Taranto.404 Therefore, to argue more persuasively 
before these judges, a litigator must convince the judge that the 
practice is either new or long prevalent, depending on the side the 
litigator represents. 
How does a litigator persuade the judge that the practice 
claimed in the patent is not a long prevalent practice? The pre-
eminent example is DDR. The DDR court found that the claimed 
invention addressed a new problem: visitors to a website leaving 
the website via a hyperlink to purchase a product on another 
website, and thereby reducing the original website’s visitor 
traffic.405 The practice was not long prevalent because the internet 
was relatively new and the practice could not have existed 
beforehand.406 Therefore, if a litigator seeks to convince the judges 
that it is not a long prevalent practice, he or she may argue that the 
practice is new because the problem it solves did not  
previously exist.407 
Furthermore, a litigator may argue that a practice has not been 
long prevalent by differentiating the instant invention from similar, 
                                                                                                             
404 See supra Sections II.B.1.a–b. 
405 See DDR Holdings, L.L.C. v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed.  
Cir. 2014). 
406 See id. 
407 See id. 
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long prevalent practices. The litigator could, for example, point out 
that, like in DDR, the invention is for a completely new platform or 
that the process is different than the long prevalent practice.408 
Conversely, a litigator who endeavors to invalidate the patent 
as claiming patent-ineligible subject matter could argue that the 
problem has existed for a long time, and that changing the platform 
in which the problem exists does not change the problem itself. For 
example, in DDR, the dissent argued that the analogous long 
prevalent practice was a kiosk within a larger store, and therefore, 
the practice of keeping someone in the store while purchasing 
something from someone else was long prevalent.409 However, the 
majority rejected this argument as not analogous, because when 
someone walks up to a kiosk in a store they are not instantly 
transported to a different location, as occurs when a website visitor 
clicks on a hyperlink.410 For a litigator to successfully argue this 
point, he or she must identify the same practice, not a similar 
practice, and show that it has been previously performed for a long 
time. For instance, Judge Chen identified the data acquisition and 
analysis process in Content Extraction as long prevalent because 
humans have always collected and analyzed data in that way.411 
Other judges, such as Judges Hughes and Stoll, primarily 
compared the instant invention to the Supreme Court’s and Federal 
Circuit’s precedent.412 For these judges, the litigator should focus 
on arguing just that: whether the instant case is similar or different 
from precedent. If a litigator is arguing before a panel including 
these two judges, the litigator should argue that the invention at 
issue is similar to or different from precedent, especially the 
Supreme Court’s precedent in Bilski, Diehr, and Alice. For 
example, Judge Hughes analogized the claimed invention in Planet 
                                                                                                             
408 See id. 
409 See id. at 1258. 
410 See id. 
411 See Content Extraction & Transmission L.L.C. v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 
776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
412 See supra Sections II.B.1.c–d. 
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Bingo to the inventions in Alice and Bilski.413 A prudent litigator 
arguing against invalidity could also analogize the Federal 
Circuit’s precedent in Enfish or DDR, while litigators seeking to 
prove invalidity could distinguish those inventions. 
2. Alice Step Two 
The Federal Circuit judges have taken similar approaches to 
determining whether the claimed invention contains an inventive 
concept under the second step of the Alice test.414 The question is: 
what is different in the claimed invention as compared to the 
abstract idea? To put it another way, if you remove the abstract 
idea from the claimed invention, is there something left that would 
constitute patent-eligible subject matter? The Federal Circuit 
judges’ decisions that this Note examined ask whether the process 
claimed in the patent, including the components described therein, 
is conventional.415 Therefore, litigators proving that the patent is 
not invalid should argue that there is something different either in 
the steps themselves or the order of the steps from the conventional 
practice. For example, the BASCOM court held that filtering at a 
remote and centralized location, as opposed to at the users’ 
location, constituted an inventive concept because the filtering was 
done out of order as compared to the conventional process.416 
Litigators could focus on the uniqueness of the invention and 
explain what is different about the step itself or the order of the 
steps from the abstract idea. 
In addition to the claimed steps themselves, the Federal Circuit 
judges also look at the components described in the steps.417 If the 
components, such as computers, interfaces, etc., are special or 
different in some way, an inventive concept may therein lie. 
Litigators could therefore not only look at the steps, but also the 
                                                                                                             
413 See Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, No. 2013-1663, slip op. at 5 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 
26, 2014) (discussing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) and Alice Corp. v. 
CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2356–57 (2014)). 
414 See supra Section II.B. 
415 See supra Section II.B. 
416 See BASCOM Internet Servs. v. AT&T Mobility L.L.C., 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016). 
417 See supra Section II.B. 
166          FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVIII:1 
 
computers and other components included in those steps. If there is 
something unique about those components, the litigator could 
emphasize it in his or her brief arguing against invalidity. 
Litigators may also persuade judges through policy 
arguments.418 Litigators seeking to prove that the patent is not 
invalid could argue that the claims are narrowed enough such that 
the patent would not preempt the basic tools of scientific work. For 
example, in BASCOM, Judge Chen noted that the patent claimed 
only a single method of filtering content, not the general idea of 
filtering content.419 However, the litigators should avoid arguing 
that the invention’s application is limited to a technological 
environment by the patentee. The court is not receptive to this 
argument, having found that a patent holder artificially limiting the 
application to a certain technological environment is insufficient to 
convey an inventive concept.420 
On the contrary, litigators seeking to prove invalidity for 
claiming patent-ineligible subject matter could argue that the 
claimed invention is the same as the abstract idea and any 
deviations the claimed invention might contain from the abstract 
idea are insignificant. For example, in BASCOM the litigator 
seeking to invalidate the patent could argue that the order of the 
steps does not matter because it is still the abstract idea of filtering 
internet content. Further, the litigators could argue that the 
components described in the steps are generic. For example, the 
litigator could argue that a claimed computer that the patent holder 
                                                                                                             
418 See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting 
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010)) (invalidating a patent because, inter alia, 
it would preempt “basic tools of scientific and technological work” and “‘impede 
innovation more than it would tend to promote it,’ thereby thwarting the primary object 
of patent law” (quoting Ass’n of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc, 133 S. Ct. 
2107, 2116 (2013))); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 
1289, 1293 (2012); BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350 (finding an inventive concept because, 
inter alia, the invention would not preempt every way of filtering content, only a single 
specific way). 
419 See BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350. 
420 See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I L.L.C. v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1330 
(Fed. Cir. 2017); Content Extraction & Transmission L.L.C. v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l 
Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 
1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
2017]   PATENTLY INSANE FOR PATENTS 167 
 
contends is unique is merely a generic computer or that it is an 
industry standard computer. 
Furthermore, the litigator seeking invalidation could argue that 
a patent on this invention would preempt the basic tools of 
scientific work, therefore hindering scientific progress and 
thwarting the patent system’s constitutional purpose. For instance, 
the litigator could show that the invention is not limited to an 
embodiment and could be executed through various mediums, such 
as a computer or telephone. 
Knowing the judges’ methodology in determining whether a 
patent claims patent-eligible subject matter empowers attorneys 
whether they are arguing for or against patentability to more 
persuasively argue before the Federal Circuit. Depending on the 
panel’s make up, litigators can now tune their arguments to those 
judges. For example, if the panel includes Judges Chen and 
Taranto, the litigators could debate whether the practice has been 
long prevalent under the first step of the Alice test. On the contrary, 
if the panel includes Judges Hughes and Stoll, the litigators could 
instead compare the instant invention to precedent. Under the 
second step of the Alice inquiry, the judges share a similar 
approach, but some judges may be slightly different. For example, 
Judge Chen occasionally asks whether the claims are sufficiently 
limited in addition to inquiring whether the steps, taken both 
individually and as an ordered combination, and the components 
recited therein are conventional or generic.421 Thus, through the 
analysis above, litigators will more persuasively argue before the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 
B. Where Is the Federal Circuit Going? 
1. The Federal Circuit Judges’ Directions 
The Federal Circuit judges have not had too many 
opportunities to decide cases regarding patentable subject matter. 
A few judges have authored multiple decisions and developed a 
concrete methodology to deciding them. On the other hand, several 
                                                                                                             
421 See supra Section II.B.1.a. 
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judges on the Federal Circuit have written one or zero decisions on 
the topic. In the long term, all the Federal Circuit judges will 
author decisions and begin to develop their approach. But, what 
will that approach be? 
The judges are most divided on deciding whether the claimed 
invention is directed to an abstract idea under the first step of the 
Alice inquiry.422 However, the two prevailing methodologies—
asking whether the claimed invention is a long prevalent practice 
and comparing the claimed invention to precedent—result in the 
same outcome.423 The purpose of noting the difference is to more 
persuasively argue to the judges who employ one methodology or 
the other. For example, while examining a patent claiming a 
hedging process, a judge asking whether a practice has been long 
prevalent will note that hedging is a long prevalent practice and 
will accordingly hold the patent directed to an abstract idea. A 
judge comparing the patent claiming a hedging process will look to 
the Supreme Court’s precedent in Bilski and find that, like the 
patent in Bilski claiming hedging, the patent is directed to an 
abstract idea. But, the Supreme Court in Bilski held the hedging 
process directed to an abstract idea because it was a long prevalent 
practice.424 Therefore, either way, the Federal Circuit is asking the 
same question in either a more or less direct fashion. 
Under the second step of the Alice test the judges who have 
decided upon a methodology have been relatively consistent with 
each other. Indeed, the decisions by judges who have written only 
a few decisions, but have not fully defined their methodology, 
implement the same approach as the judges who have a more 
defined method: asking whether the claimed components and steps 
taken individually or as an ordered combination are conventional 
or generic. However, other judges do consider other factors.425 Yet, 
those other factors are simply other ways to ask the same question: 
whether the patent, if found not invalid, will preempt the basic 
tools of scientific progress. Therefore, at most, there are two 
                                                                                                             
422 See generally supra Section II.B. 
423 See generally supra Section II.B. 
424 See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010). 
425 See supra Section II.B.2. 
2017]   PATENTLY INSANE FOR PATENTS 169 
 
questions to consider under the second step of Alice: (1) whether 
the components and steps are conventional or generic, and (2) 
whether the patent will preempt the tools of scientific 
development. The judges who are still developing their approach 
or have not written any decisions will likely follow suit and ask at 
least the first of these inquiries, and possibly the second, because it 
gets to the heart of patent law: promoting scientific progress. 
2. The Federal Circuit’s Direction 
Besides the judges’ approaches, substantively, where is the 
Federal Circuit heading regarding patentable subject matter? The 
Federal Circuit is expanding its definition of patentable subject 
matter to stay current with rapidly advancing technology.426 While, 
as noted by the Court in Bilski, the Court previously would likely 
have found software and business method inventions unpatentable, 
the court is adjusting to new technology.427 Indeed, the Alice 
decision made it more difficult to obtain a software patent, because 
it eliminated the patentee’s ability to patent general ideas 
embodied in software on a computer, and instead required the 
patentee to focus on the specific application of those ideas. 
Furthermore, this effect is not harmful overall because patents 
claiming ideas would stymie scientific progress.428 The Alice 
decision did not remove all possibility of a software patent, but 
instead created a two-step test that attempts to eliminate patents 
claiming ideas, while allowing specific applications of those ideas 
to obtain patent protection.429 
The Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence likewise demonstrates this 
expansion. In DDR the Federal Circuit held a function on a website 
was not invalid because the practice and problem solved were 
                                                                                                             
426 See, e.g., Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229. 
427 See id. 
428 See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012)) 
(invalidating a patent claiming a judicial exception because it would “‘impede innovation 
more than it would tend to promote it,’ thereby thwarting the primary object of  
patent law”). 
429 See id. at 2355–57. 
170          FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVIII:1 
 
unique to the internet and not long-prevalent.430 In essence, the 
DDR court began the process of allowing software patents when 
the court had previously invalidated any such patents.431 Then, 
Enfish expanded the category of patentable subject matter to 
include computer programs that improve the functioning of 
computers.432 In other words, patents that improve computer 
functions, not just solve a new problem, are found not invalid.433 
Moreover, in BASCOM, the court expanded what is patentable to 
include conventional or generic pieces if they are ordered in an 
unconventional way.434 Thus, the court added computer 
components to steps that were organized in a different way than 
the abstract idea to the acceptable software patents, once again 
enlarging the realm of patentable software.435 In sum, the Federal 
Circuit is finding new ways within the bounds imposed by the 
Alice test to find patentable subject matter and will likely continue 
to do so. As the Alice court stated, the precise contours of an 
abstract idea are not defined.436 Therefore, the Federal Circuit has 
leeway to define the judicial exception through its case law. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the Alice decision, patentable subject matter eligibility 
has generated much uncertainty among attorneys and resulted in 
mass invalidation of patents.437 Consequently, many scholars have 
tried to identify how the court makes such decisions as well as 
posit theories as to how the court should make those decisions.438 
However, through a different approach, this Note identifies trends 
within the Federal Circuit judges’ decisions to alleviate some of 
                                                                                                             
430 See DDR Holdings, L.L.C. v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed.  
Cir. 2014). 
431 See id. 
432 See Enfish, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
433 See id. 
434 See BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs. v. AT&T Mobility L.L.C., 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 
(Fed. Cir. 2016). 
435 See id. 
436 See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357 (2014). 
437 See supra Section I.E. 
438 See supra note 138. 
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that uncertainty.439 This Note has shown how four judges have a 
consistent approach to deciding these cases440 and how trends are 
identifiable in several other judges’ decisions.441 With this 
knowledge, litigators can better persuade the Federal Circuit either 
to invalidate or not invalidate a patent.442 Furthermore, the 
individual judges’ approaches shed light on where the Federal 
Circuit is headed as a whole.443 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
439 See supra Section II.B. 
440 See supra Section II.B.1. 
441 See supra Section II.B.2. 
442 See supra Section III.A. 
443 See supra Section III.B. 
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APPENDIX: SUMMARIZING TABLES 
Appendix A: Consistent Federal Circuit Judges Summary Table 
 
Judge Alice Step One Factors Alice Step Two Factors 
Judge Raymond  
T. Chen 
Judge Richard  
G. Taranto 
Whether the claimed 
invention has been long 
prevalent. 
(1) Whether the claimed 
steps are conventional and 
components are generic. 
(2) Whether the claims are 
sufficiently limited as to not 
preempt the basic tools of 
scientific progress. 
Judge Todd  
M. Hughes 
Judge Kara  
F. Stoll 
Compares the claimed 
invention to precedent. 
Whether the claimed steps 
are conventional and 
components are generic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017]   PATENTLY INSANE FOR PATENTS 173 
 
Appendix B: Federal Circuit Judges Developing Methodologies 
Summary Table 
 
 
Judge: Alice Step One Factors: Alice Step Two Factors: 
Judge S. Jay 
Plager 
Only one decision, 
therefore, there is no trend. 
(1) Whether the claimed 
steps are conventional and 
components claimed are 
generic. 
(2) Compares the instant 
claimed invention to 
precedent. 
Judge Jimmie 
V. Reyna 
No distinct trend, but has 
considered in varying 
combinations: 
(1) Whether the steps are 
conventional and 
components claimed are 
generic. 
(2) Compares the instant 
claimed invention to 
precedent. 
(3) Whether a human could 
perform the claimed 
process without a computer. 
No distinct trend, but has 
considered in varying 
combinations: 
(1) Whether the claimed 
invention is a way to 
achieve a result or the result 
itself. 
(2) Whether the claimed 
invention has been long 
prevalent. 
(3) Compares the instant 
claimed invention to 
precedent. 
Judge William 
C. Bryson 
Consistently compares the 
instant claimed invention to 
precedent, but has also 
considered in varying 
combinations: 
(1) Whether the claimed 
invention has been long 
prevalent. 
(2) Whether the claimed 
invention is a way to 
achieve a result or the result 
itself. 
Consistently considers 
whether the claimed steps 
are conventional and 
components are generic, but 
also compares the instant 
claimed invention to 
precedent.  
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 (3) Whether the claims are 
sufficiently limited as to not 
preempt the basic tools of 
scientific progress. 
 
Judge Sharon 
Prost 
No distinct trend, but 
regularly: 
(1) Relies on her own 
judgment. 
(2) Asks whether the 
claimed invention was long 
prevalent. 
(3) Compares the instant 
claimed invention to 
precedent. 
Consistently considers 
whether the claimed steps 
are conventional and 
components are generic, but 
also occasionally compares 
the instant claimed 
invention to precedent. 
Judge Alan  
D. Lourie 
No distinct trend, but 
regularly: 
(1) Considers whether the 
claimed invention has a 
concrete form. 
(2) Compares the instant 
claimed invention to 
precedent. 
Constantly considers 
whether the claimed steps 
are conventional and 
components are generic. 
Judge Pauline 
Newman 
No distinct trend, but 
regularly: 
(1) Considers whether the 
claimed invention is a way 
to achieve a result or the 
result itself. 
(2) Compares the instant 
claimed invention to 
precedent. 
Only one decision, 
therefore, there is no 
distinct trend. 
